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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no accident that the [1934 Securities Exchange] Act
was promulgated in the aftermath of the greatest economic
catastrophe in U.S. history. The law and macroeconomics
of the Act was patent: Roosevelt sought to place the
American capitalistic system upon a firmer legal and
regulatory foundation. Most urgently, Roosevelt sought to
take positive action to restore investor confidence and spur
more investment transactions leading to greater economic
growth.1
Here we are again. History repeated. This time, President Obama
is the man history will find at the center of an economic crisis rivaled only
by Roosevelt's Great Depression. President Obama has acted swiftly in the
face of this "Great Recession," 2 proposing his own financial New Deal in
June 2009, styled: Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation:
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (Obama Whitepaper).
President Obama has continued with regulation of the securities industry
where President Roosevelt left off with the industry's self-regulation.4
Congress then took the baton, with the House and Senate introducing their
financial reform bills.
This Article examines and compares the key proposals from the
Obama Administration and Congress that affect broker-dealers. It then
argues that Congress should specifically study and then legislate these new
standards, and not give the SEC broad new authorities to regulate them.
The Article concludes that permitting the SEC to regulate these new
standards will create years of judicial confusion and policymaking by the
courts, which will in turn make business practices and transactions in the
securities industry riskier and more uncertain, the costs of which will
ultimately be borne by the consumer in the form of higher costs and lack of
robust product options as issuers, underwriters, and sponsors market their
' Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional Obligations ofSecurities Brokers Under
Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 559-60 (2002).
2 See Justin Lahart, U.S. Economy Pulls Out of Tailspin, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1-2,
2009, at Al (confirming with data that "[t]he current recession is now the worst
since World War II").
3 See generally, U.S. TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009)
[hereinafter Obama Whitepaper].
4id.
s See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2010); The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. (2010); Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
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products in non-U.S. regulated markets.6 And because overzealous
enforcement of the U.S. securities markets could drive companies to foreign
exchanges, 7 this Article calls for moderation in enacting practical yet
effective new standards for securities broker dealers.
This Article follows this historic financial legislation and legislative
process in "real time," with pen first put to paper when the Obama
Administration released its Whitepaper, and subsequent drafts following the
proposed congressional bills, as well as the concomitant heated political
and legal debates and challenges facing this unique and comprehensive
financial overhaul. After early drafts of this Article were sent to Congress,
various proposals in the Article found their way into draft congressional
bills.'
A. Executive Summary
President Obama's Whitepaper outlines the challenges facing
modem financial supervision and regulation, and proposes to meet those
challenges with reforms geared toward meeting five objectives, one of
which is to "protect consumers and investors from financial abuse."9 This
objective includes empowering the SEC, through legislation, with new tools
6 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163-64
(2008) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1974)).
7 See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Damian Paletta, Climax Looms for Finance Bill,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2010 at Al, A4 ("New Hampshire Sen. Judd Gregg
responded that if Republicans do not unify against the bill, Congress could pass
legislation that would chase the derivatives industry overseas and into even darker
corners."); see also John D. McKinnon, Lawmakers Target Investment Banks,
WALL. ST. J., May 5, 2010, at Cl (noting that Congress raising investment bank
duties to customers from suitability to fiduciary in the wake of the Goldman
investigation could "foster unintended consequences that harm business and
investors alike.").
8 On August 24, 2009, the Author sent an early copy of this Article's manuscript to
Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Committee on Financial
Services and Sponsor of HR 4173. It appears that some of the proposals and
concerns raised in the manuscript of this Article were adopted or addressed in the
most recent bills pending before Congress. The Author is unable to confirm
whether this Article contributed to any of the subsequent amendments to the
House or Senate bills. Particularly interesting is the Senate bill's adoption of one
of this Article's primary proposals - that Congress first study and then legislate
new conduct standards for broker-dealers and advisers. See S. 3217, §913(b).
9 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 3.
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and authority to regulate broker-dealers, investment advisers, and the
products and services they provide.'o
Attempting to add legislative form to its proposals in the Obama
Whitepaper, Treasury released its first piece of proposed legislation entitled
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (Consumer
Protection Act)." The Consumer Protection Act proposes reforms in
regulating the banking, financial, mortgage, and credit card industries by,
among other things, greatly expanding the power of the Federal Reserve,
and creating a powerful new Consumer Financial Protection Agency to
regulate and oversee all financial matters and products affecting retail
financial consumers.12 But the Consumer Protection Act expressly exempts
from its authority and jurisdiction brokers and dealers that must register
under the Securities Act of 1934, and investment advisers and companies
"required to be registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940" and
"Investment Company Act of 1940."l3
On July 10, 2009, one month after issuing the Whitepaper,
President Obama's Treasury Department released a second proposed statute
entitled the Investor Protection Act of 2009 (Investor Protection Act),
designed to carry out the consumer-protection objective as to broker-dealers
and investment advisers.14
On October 15, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced
House Bill 3817, a bill entitled the Investor Protection Act of 2009,
embodying Treasury's proposed statute, but adding some additional and
different provisions.' 5 On December 2, 2009, Congressman Barney Frank
sponsored House Bill 4173, entitled the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009.16 The Investor Protection Act of 2009 is contained
in Title V, Subtitle C of House Bill 4173," and supplements House Bill
3817 with additional important and controversial provisions affecting
broker-dealers.
'oSee id. at 15.
"See generally U.S. TREASURY, TITLE X-CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
AGENCY ACT (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CFPA-
Act.pdf [hereinafter Consumer Protection Act].
" See id.
13 Consumer Protection Act, supra note 11, §§ 1002(28), 1022(f)(2)(A).
14 See U.S. TREASURY, TITLE IX - ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL
MARKETS REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tg205O71009.pdf [hereinafter Investor
Protection Act].
15 See Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
16 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2009) [hereinafter Investor Protection Act of 2009]
7 Id. §§7001-7803.
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On November 10, 2009, Senator Chris Dodd introduced 1,100
pages of draft legislation styled the Restoring American Financial Stability
Act of 2009.18 On March 15, 2010, after months of partisan debate and
rancor, Senator Dodd introduced the formal Senate bill, styled the Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010.9 The Senate bill mandates a
study of fiduciary conduct standards for broker-dealers, followed by
appropriate legislation or regulation. 2 0 The Senate bill's "study proposal is
likely to survive the floor debate and the reconciliation with the House
bill."2 1 Indeed, the final bill passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010 includes
the study. On June 26, 2010, the House and Senate merged their versions
of the bill into the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act." The combined bill retains the fiduciary duty study.
Because future study and legislation of conduct standards for broker-dealers
will be based on the draft Obama legislation and most recent House and
Senate bills, 22 this Article includes a thorough analysis of each.
18 See Radio broadcast: Dodd Proposes Financial Reform Legislation (National
Public Radio Nov. 10, 2009). Senator Dodd's draft legislation was the starting
point for the final version of the bill formally introduced in the Senate on March
15, 2010. For an overview of Senator Dodd's draft bill, see James Hamilton &
Richard Roth, Senate Banking Committee Releases Draft Legislation: Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2009 (CCH) (2009). On November 2, 2009,
the House introduced H.R. 3996, similarly styled the Financial Stability
Improvement Act of 2009, but much shorter and limited in scope to regulating the
systemic risks to the U.S. financial system and the global economy. Financial
Stability Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). H.R.
3996 confirms that the SEC is the "primary financial regulatory authority" for all
brokers, dealers, investment companies, and investment advisers, but, interestingly,
as those terms are defined under the pre-Obama securities laws. See H.R. 3996,
§§ 1000(b)(6)(E), 1403(2)(F).
19 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2010).
20 See id. at §913(b).
21 Hill Watch, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 645 (Apr.5, 2010); see also
Report Accompanying S. 3217, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, at 87 ("The study in Section 913 will provide the opportunity to
reexamine this issue and may provide a basis for future regulatory actions.").
Indeed, the final bill passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010 excluded various
proposed amendments that would have immediately imposed the same fiduciary
duties on broker dealers and investment advisers, and rejected attempts by some
Senators to impose criminal liability for willful violations of the fiduciary duty.
See Specter, Kaufinan Seek Fiduciary Duty for Brokers, Coupled With Threat of
Jail Time, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 889 (May 10, 2010).
22 See, e.g., Malini Manickavasagam, Aguilar Urges Congress to Extend Fiduciary
Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 571-72
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There are many aspects to the Obama Whitepaper and proposed
bills in Congress. This Article discusses the five arguably most important
proposals that are relevant to securities broker-dealers:
1. legislating a mandate to the SEC to enact rules replacing
the suitability standard with a uniform, federally defined
fiduciary duty governing both broker-dealers and
investment advisers;23
2. legislating authority for the SEC to limit or prohibit
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in broker-dealer
customer agreements; 24
3. providing monetary awards and attorney fees for
whistleblowers reporting securities fraud to the SEC, as
well as steep civil penalties and separate attorney fee
awards against employers that retaliate against
whistleblowers; 25
4. providing authority for the SEC to propose an amendment
to the federal securities laws to provide a "single explicit
standard for primary liability [for securities fraud] to
replace various circuits' formulations of different 'tests'
for primary liability;" 26 and
5. legislating Senior Investment Protection provisions that
require the SEC to establish a federal grant program to
encourage States to, among other things, adopt suitability
rules for sales of securities to seniors, with mandates that
states receiving federal grant funds each establish rules
regulating the suitability and sale of all annuity products.27
(Mar. 29, 2010) (noting that SEC Commissioner Aguilar still wants uniform
fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and advisers, expressing his opinion on the
House and Senate bills).
S. 3217, §913; H.R. 4173, § 7103; Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 71-72.
24 S. 3217, §921; H.R. 4173, § 7201; Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 62-63.
25 S. 3217, §922; H.R. 4173, §§ 7203-04; Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 72-
73.
26 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 72-73. This will prove interesting because
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected one version of the SEC's primary liability test that
had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). This is a paradigm of why Congress
should not provide the SEC with increased broad powers to regulate and penalize
broker-dealers as proposed by the Obama Administration. Instead, Congress itself
should study and legislate specific new standards.
27 H.R. 4173, §§ 7703-06. Other notable proposals in the House bill (H.R. 4173) of
which broker-dealers should be aware include:
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* Amending the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 to subject "brokers" and
"dealers" to its accounting and auditing provisions, legislating
responsibility for broker dealers to fund the oversight of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (the "Board") under Sarbanes "in
proportion to the broker or dealer's net capital compared to the total net
capital of all brokers and dealer[s]," and authorizing the Board to refer
investigations of broker dealers under Sarbanes to the SEC or a self
regulatory organization. H.R. 4173, §§7601-7610; see also SEC
Reviewing Point-of-Sale Disclosures Beyond Mutual Fund Industry,
Schapiro Says, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 260-61 (Feb. 15,
2010) (SEC Chairman Shapiro notes that in the Spring 2010 the SEC "will
consider staff recommendations to have SROs develop and maintain a
consolidated audit trail that captures data across markets.");
* Authorizing the SEC to designate "one or more self-regulatory
organizations," or a "national securities organization," to "augment" the
SEC's efforts to regulate investment advisers, see H.R. 4173,
§§7107(a)(2)(B), 7208(g); see also 155 CONG. REC. H14747, 14748-49
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Reps. Cohen & Bachus) (stripping
a proposed provision that would permit the SEC to delegate regulation of
investment advisers to FINRA, as opposed to the current language
allowing FINRA to "augment" the SEC's oversight. Representative Cohn
slammed FINRA as biased towards broker dealers and thus too conflicted
to oversee investment advisers. Representative Bachus objected, noting
that Bernie Madoff operated both a brokerage and investment adviser
office, and that his fraud occurred in the investment adviser side of the
business, and was not caught by the SEC, but may have been by FINRA);
see also SEC Staff Mulling Recommendation for Custody Disclosures
from Brokers, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 263-64 (Feb. 15,
2010) (noting the SEC wants to impose adviser custody rules on brokers
because Madoff held advisory clients' assets in a related brokerage he
owned).
* Mandating a study by the Comptroller General of the United States on the
unique role of financial planners, see H.R. 4173, §7108;
* Settling a circuit split on interpretation of the SEC's statutory aiding and
abetting standard by amending the statute to provide that one who
"recklessly" provides substantial assistance is liable for aiding and
abetting securities fraud, see H.R. 4173, §7215;
* Extending jurisdiction of U.S. district courts to handle securities fraud
lawsuits involving conduct or actions occurring outside the United States,
see H.R. 4173, §7216;
* Enhanced SEC authority to conduct surveillance, examinations, and risk
assessments for broker dealers and investment advisers, see H.R. 4173,
§7218;
* Comprehensive study examining the SEC's organization, operations, and
relationship with self-regulatory organizations, see H.R. 4173, §7304;
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The Article concludes with a request that Congress resist the inclination to
reactively swing the regulation and enforcement pendulum too far and
unnecessarily over-regulate broker-dealers. This could adversely affect the
U.S. financial markets by driving publicly-traded companies to foreign
exchanges. The good news is that Congress, with its experience and
expertise in studying, analyzing, and making policy, is in a much better
position to strike the right balance between increased regulation of broker
dealers and ensuring the most suitable securities products are still available
on U.S. securities exchanges.
B. Topical Summaries
1. Fiduciary Duty
Imposing a uniform fiduciary duty on broker-dealers and
investment advisers is arguably the most important and wide-ranging
proposal of the Obama Whitepaper. But it does not endeavor to define the
specifics of what the fiduciary duty will look like. The draft Investor
Protection Act does by seeking to amend the 1934 Act and the 1940
Investment Advisers Act by providing the SEC with authority, but not
requiring it, to "establish a fiduciary duty for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, and harmoniz[e] . . . the regulation of brokers, dealers,
and investments advisers."2 8 But the Act does not really legislate a
* Creation of a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board that will assist the
SEC in governing the registration and regulation of all "Municipal
Financial Advisers," as defined by the Act, see H.R. 4173, §7411; and
* Authorizing the SEC Chairman to appoint an Ombudsman to act as a
confidential intermediary between the SEC and any affected person,
including broker dealers, see H.R. 4173, §7420.
28 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, §913. See also Mutual Fund
Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1964, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). This Act,
introduced in the Senate, also seeks to impose a uniform fiduciary duty on broker
dealers. But the focus of the Mutual Fund Act is on disclosure of the financial
relationships between broker dealers and mutual fund companies, and the
commissions paid to broker dealers from mutual fund companies in exchange for
selling their funds. 155 CONG. REc. S 10852, 10856-57 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Akaka). It is unclear whether this Senate bill will die in its
Senate committee due to its similarity to H.R. 4173. Cf SEC Reviewing Point-of-
Sale Disclosures Beyond Mutual Fund Industry, Schapiro Says, Sec. Reg. & Law
Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 260-61 (Feb. 15, 2010) (SEC Chariman Shapiro notes that if
the mutual fund legislation does not pass, "we will work as best we can under our
existing authority to try and maximize our ability to do real point-of-sale
disclosures."); cf Kimberley Strassel, Carbon Caps Through the Backdoor, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2010, at A19 (taking issue with securities and insurance regulators
imposing regulations that cannot otherwise pass as legislation).
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fiduciary standard; rather, it says the SEC "may promulgate rules" that
compel broker-dealers "to act solely in the interest of the customer or client
without regard to financial or other interest of the" broker-dealer. 29 House
Bill 4173 imposes a mandate on the SEC to promulgate rules providing for
this fiduciary standard,3 0 and adds some additional requirements and
exceptions discussed infra. The Senate bill delays enactment of a fiduciary
standard for one year to allow the SEC to study the issue, also discussed
infra.31
In the next subsection of Obama's draft legislation, the SEC is
provided a broad but vague mandate to ensure that broker-dealers and
investment advisers provide "simple and clear disclosures to investors
regarding the terms of their relationship."3 2 H.R. 4173 follows suit.3 This
is consistent with the SEC's historical disclosure-based regulation of broker
dealers. But the next subsection can be seen as merits-based regulation of
broker-dealer products by providing broader and even vaguer legislative
authority for the SEC to "promulgate rules prohibiting... sales practices,
conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers that the Commission deems contrary to the public
interest and the protection of investors."34 What is contrary to the public or
investors' interest the Act does not say. This lack of policy direction and
more specific congressional authority is a breeding ground for mischief.
While the Investor Protection Act is short on specifics of what its
mandated fiduciary duty will look like, there are plenty of existing ideas
and scholarship on what a fiduciary duty may look like for broker dealers
because the idea is not new at all, and has been presaged and studied in
depth by many commentators and the SEC for some time. A review of
these authorities, discussed infra, reveals that if ultimately passed by
Congress, these sections of the Investor Protection Act have the potential to
drastically change the business practices and bottom line of broker-dealers.
Imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers will require them to avoid self-
dealing and all conflicts of interest with customers, which may curtail the
most profitable securities products currently sold by broker-dealers;
products which may be the most suitable and appropriate for many
29 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 913.
30 See H.R. 4173, §§ 7103(m)(1), 7103(g)(1).
31 See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. §
913 (2d Sess. 2010).
32 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, §913(a)(1)(1).
3 H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(h)(1).
Investor Protection Act, § 913(1)(1)-(2); H.R. 4173, § 7103(n)(2).
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investors." Moreover, broker-dealers that sell "only proprietary or other
limited range of products" must disclose this to customers and obtain their
"consent or acknowledgement" before making a sale. 6
A uniform fiduciary duty may also chill efforts by issuers and
sponsors to create new products that conform and adapt to changes in
customer needs based on consequences in the global financial market. For
example, these new duties carry with them the potential of effectively
precluding broker-dealers from offering transaction-based commission
accounts along with the now popular fee-based brokerage accounts, or
preventing broker-dealers from offering otherwise suitable securities
products because they are underwritten by them or for which they are paid a
fee by the product's underwriter or issuer. H.R. 4173 notes that "[t]he
receipt of compensation based on commission or other standard
compensation for the sale of securities shall not, in and of itself, be
considered a violation of such standard applied to a broker or dealer." 37
But, significantly, it does not say (as it does say for investment advisers)
that the receipt of "fees" shall not be considered a violation. So are broker
dealers offering fee-based brokerage accounts presumed to be violating the
new fiduciary duty standard?
In addition, it remains unclear whether the proposed uniform
fiduciary duty will obligate all broker-dealers to obtain training, licensing,
and expertise in areas traditionally occupied by investment advisers, such as
tax, accounting, estate planning, retirement planning, investment planning,
pension consulting, and portfolio management and wrap fee programs.
And if broker dealers don't obtain this expertise, are they liable for
securities fraud? Will broker dealers continue to exist separately from
investment advisers? 40 Will broker dealers or investment advisers be able
to sell many of the securities products currently marketed that violate a
strict fiduciary standard? These issues and questions may hamper the
3 H.R. 4173's amendment to the Investment Advisers Act references a waiver
provision when it notes in passing that a conflict of interest "may be consented to
the customer." H.R. 4173, §710 3 (g)(1).
See id. § 7103(m)(2).
37 Id. § 7103(m)(1).
38 Cf H.R. 4173, supra note 16, § 7103(m)(1), 7103(a)(3)(g)(1).
39 A "wrap fee" program is an investment program that bundles together a suite of
services, such as brokerage, advisory, research, and management, for a single flat
fee. The wrap fee is usually paid quarterly, and typically ranges from one percent
to three percent of the value of the assets in the account. Wrap fee programs are a
common service offered by investment advisers. See RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST.,
49, t.4.9 (2008) [hereinafter RAND Study].
40 Indeed, a section entitled "Harmonization of Enforcement" in H.R. 4173 notes
that the SEC can use the enforcement authority of the 1940 Investment Advisers
Act against broker dealers for violating the fiduciary duty standard, as well as use
the 1934 Exchange Act against investment advisers. H.R. 4173, § 7103(b)(1).
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ability of U.S.-based retail securities to compete with those in other
countries and exchanges. An example of current profitable broker-dealer
arrangements that will violate the proposed fiduciary standard are
arrangements some broker-dealers have with insurance companies in which
insurers pay broker-dealers to exclusively offer their annuity products.
2. Abrogation ofArbitration Agreements
Another major proposal of Obama's Investor Protection Act is to
give the SEC power to "prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the
use of," mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements that currently compel
customers to arbitrate disputes with their broker-dealer under the rules of
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 4 1 FINRA is the self-
regulatory organization created pursuant to the congressional intent of the
1934 Act that broker-dealers regulate themselves. The only condition on
the SEC's new grant of authority is that it "find" that abrogating an
arbitration agreement is "in the public interest and for the protection of
investors."42  The Act again does not define when this new power to
abrogate arbitration agreements is "in the public interest and for the
protection of investors."A But one thing is clear: the Obama
Administration proposes a marked shift from Roosevelt's policy of self-
regulation of broker-dealer conduct and their disputes with customers.
This provision calls into question the future relevance and
effectiveness of self-regulatory organizations like FINRA. And if
suitability (or fiduciary) claims are forced back into court under the
Exchange Act, courts will be required to ensure plaintiffs plead and prove
the stringent requirements of scienter and reliance before a jury has the
ability to render big-money damage judgments. But if broker-dealers are
fiduciaries, then it is possible plaintiffs will be relegated to bringing breach
of fiduciary duty claims under the Advisers Act, which provides more
lenient liability standards but limited private remedies; it precludes private
damage remedies for lost investment value. Perhaps this is why the
Investor Protection Act provides handsome rewards and protections to
41 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 921(m); H.R. 4173, § 7201(p); S. 3217,
§921(a)(1).
42 Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, supra note 16, § 72 01(p); S. 3217,
§921(a)(1).
43 Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, supra note 16, § 72 01(p); S. 3217,
§921(a)(1).
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whistleblowers and their lawyers; an olive branch for gutting big damage
securities fraud cases."
3. Whistleblower Rewards and Protections
The Investor Protection Act also proposes to empower the SEC to
financially reward, and protect from retaliation, securities fraud
whistleblowers. If the fraud exposed by the whistleblower results in a
monetary sanction of $1 million or more, the SEC may pay an award to the
whistleblower in an amount not exceeding thirty percent of the total
sanction. 45 The Senate bill limits the award to thirty percent "of what has
been collected" of the total sanction, but also provides for a minimum
award of "not less than ten percent" of the total sanction collected.46 In a
boon to the securities plaintiffs bar, one of the factors the SEC must
consider when determining an award amount is "the degree of assistance
provided by . . . any legal representative of the whistleblower in such
action."4 7 In yet another boon for the plaintiffs bar, the Act also provides a
new cause of action for whistleblowers against an employer for retaliating
against a whistleblower employee reporting under the Act. It also provides
statutory penalties of two times the amount of back pay due the employee
"with interest," and any "special damages" incurred by the whistleblower,
which include "litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorneys' fees."" In short, the Investor Protection Act seeks to essentially
transform the securities plaintiffs bar into a private SEC. As currently
enacted, the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Exchange Act prohibit the SEC
from paying attorneys' fees and expenses of "private parties" with funds
disgorged as a result of an SEC action absent a court or administrative
order.49 The 1940 Investment Advisers Act is silent on this score.50
This provision is likely a response to the recent criticism that the
SEC Division of Enforcement has not historically "aggressively pursued
tips and whistle-blower complaints," citing the Bernie Madoff debacle as
4 H.R. 4173 requires the Comptroller of the United States to conduct a detailed
study, due to Congress no later than one year after enactment, reviewing the costs,
recoveries, and other issues relating to securities arbitrations. H.R. 4173, supra
note 16, § 7202. The Senate bill does not mandate a study, but gives the SEC
discretion to conduct a rulemaking on the issue. See S. 3217, § 921(a)(1).
45 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922; H.R. 4173, § 7203.
4 See S. 3217, § 922(b)(1)(B).
47 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(b)(1); H.R. 4173, § 7203(b)(1); S.
3217, § 922(c)(B)(ii).
48 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(g)(1)(A)-(B); H.R. 4173, §
7203(g)(1)(c); S. 3217, § 922(h)(1)(C).
49 See Securities Act of 1933 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(f) (2002); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(4) (2002).
50 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (2002).
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the agency's "biggest black eye."5' Indeed, H.R. 4173 requires the SEC to
submit a report to Congress entitled Report on Implementation of 'Post-
Madoff Reforms.' 52 The SEC is responding even before new legislation
becomes effective. But legislating generous rewards for whistleblowers
and their lawyers subjects this provision to abuse. One need only review
the serial filings for quick settlements and attorney fee payments by some
plaintiffs' lawyers under a similar provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to see a clear example of why this provision of the Investor
Protection Act should be eliminated or substantially curtailed.5 4
But are the whistleblower reward and fee provisions enacted to
offset the potential that securities plaintiffs will lose their implied private
right to bring big-money damage lawsuits against broker-dealers and others
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in exchange for the limited
private remedies afforded for an investment adviser's breach of his
fiduciary duties under the Investment Advisers Act?55
4. Avoiding Problems Created by Congress Providing Too
Much Power to the SEC
A paradigm of the problematic consequences of providing the SEC
with too much discretion to regulate these new securities standards is the
current judicial confusion in determining under what standards Congress
intends to hold someone primarily liable for securities fraud under section
5' Kara Scannell, SEC Says it Got 45 Pequot Tips it Pursued, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2009, at Cl.
52 H.R. 4173, § 7306.
s3 See Kara Scannell, 'Urgency'Drives SEC Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
2009, at A2 1. The SEC is also embarking on additional controversial crackdowns,
not the least of which is an SEC interpretive release that imposes significant new
disclosure obligations on companies relating to climate change. See Matthew P.
Allen, SEC Opens the Door for Climate Change Related Shareholder Proposals
and Disclosure Requirements, With Potential New Liabilities on Public
Companies, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 359 (Mar. 1, 2010).
54 See also, Mark Maremont, Tom McGinty & Nathan Koppel, Trial Lawyers
Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, at Al (examining
political monetary contributions by securities plaintiffs law firms to institutional
investors that are those firms' most profitable clients).
5 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979)
(holding that private implied remedies under the Investment Advisers Act for
violation of an adviser's fiduciary duties preclude monetary awards for diminution
of the value of investments, and are limited to rescission of the adviser-customer
agreement and restitution of any consideration paid for the agreement (fees) less
any value conferred by the other party).
16 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5:1
JOURNAL
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and then whether those
standards are a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The debate centers
on whether Congress intended to provide for primary liability under a
"scheme-liability" standard that does not require some direct misleading
statement or omission by the defendant to the investing public. This
scheme-liability standard was created by the SEC and some federal courts
based on an interpretation of SEC Rule 1 Ob-5.
After decades of judicial interpretations and significant splits in the
federal circuits on this issue, the Supreme Court purported to finally make a
decision on this dispositive issue.56 But after the Supreme Court decided,
circuit courts are still split. Indeed, Treasury Secretary Geithner reminded
the SEC in connection with the current proposed regulatory reform that "the
administration and Congress set policy, not the regulatory agencies."5 7
Ironically, the Obama Whitepaper indicates that the administration supports
providing the SEC an opportunity to regulate its way around the adverse
Supreme Court precedent by noting that the "SEC . .. proposes amending
the federal securities laws to provide a single explicit standard for primary
liability to replace various circuits' formulation of different 'tests' for
primary liability." 8
5. Mandate ofFiyty State Suitability Rules for Variable
Annuities
At the same time H.R. 4173 creates a federal fiduciary standard, it
only requires states receiving federal grant money under the Act to adopt
FINRA's suitability rules for sales of securities, with a focus on variable
annuities.59 The Act accomplishes this with a brand new provision, entitled
Senior Investment Protection, which seeks to protect seniors60 from
"salespersons and advisers using misleading certifications and professional
designations." 6 ' The Act identifies as part of the problem the fact that
existing State laws have inadequate "suitability standards" to protect senior
investors. To remedy this problem, the Act requires the SEC to create and
oversee a grant program for states to "investigate and prosecute misleading
and fraudulent marketing practices."62
56 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
5 Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as Overhaul
Stumbles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A4.
58 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 73.
' H.R. 4173, § 7703(c)(3), (5).
60 Defined as "any individual who has attained the age of 62 years or more." H.R.
4173, § 7702(4).
61 Id. § 7701(1).
62 Id. § 7703(a)(1)(A).
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The Act imposes various requirements on states receiving the
grants, two of which are: 1) that the State adopt "standard rules on the
suitability requirements in the sale of securities," which at a minimum must
conform to FINRA suitability requirements; and 2) that the State adopt
suitability and supervision rules for "insurers and insurance producers" for
all annuity products sold in the State that are at least as protective as
FINRA Rule 2821, entitled "Members' Responsibilities Regarding
Deferred Variable Annuities."6 3 The Act requires states to "coordinate"
FINRA rules "governing broker dealers" for "State insurance regulators to
rely on."6
Recognizing the tension on broker-dealers operating under a federal
fiduciary standard while selling annuity products that are created by
insurers operating under a state suitability standard, the Act permits States
to grant "exemption from such rules only if such exemption is consistent
,,65 b
with the protection of consumers. It will be surprising if Congress passes
this portion of the Act; it seems too rife with operational and jurisdictional
confusion for broker-dealers. Indeed, the Senate bill does not include this
provision. However, the Senate bill leaves open all possibilities with its
mandate to the SEC to study these issues. And some within the SEC are
more partial to the House bill.66 So a complete analysis of the House bill is
important to the continuing debate and analysis of conduct standards for
broker-dealers when selling products like annuities.
6. Policy Effects of Increased Securities Regulation
It is no secret that calls in Washington for increased regulation of
the securities markets is largely the result of political pressures from
interest groups and the public. This is what makes our representative
system of government so wonderful. But political will is a pendulum. For
example, after a series of big money judgments against corporations in
securities fraud cases, the Clinton Administration and Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The PSLRA took
effect on December 22, 1995 and created heftier pleading and proof
63 Id. § 7703(c)(5)(B)(ii)-(vi).
6 Id. § 7703(c)(5)(B)(vii).
65 Id. § 7703(c)(5)(B)(vii)-(viii).
66 See, e.g., Malini Manickavasagam, Aguilar Urges Congress to Extend Fiduciary
Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 571-72
(Mar. 29, 2010) (noting that SEC Commissioner Aguilar still wants uniform
fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and advisers, as reflected in the House bill).
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
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standards for private securities plaintiffs. After the Enron and WorldCom
scandals became public in 2001, there was an understandable push for
increased regulation of corporate disclosures and additional grounds upon
which private plaintiffs could bring suit. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
was born. After a few years of stronger regulation and enforcement under
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and some in
the financial industry began to call for relaxed regulation and enforcement
because publicly-traded companies were joining foreign securities
exchanges instead of U.S. exchanges. The fear was that New York would
lose its title as the financial capital of the world.69
Now we have the market meltdowns and vulnerability caused by
the failures of mortgage-backed securities and the Bernie Madoff fraud.
This brings us the proposals by the Obama Administration and Congress to
once again increase securities enforcement and regulation. However,
Congress should be the entity to overhaul securities regulation, not the
SEC. Congress has the ability to avoid again swinging the pendulum too
far in one direction because it has the experience and expertise to carefully
study, analyze, and draft policy that will strike the right medium between
better regulation and enforcement of securities, and ensuring that the U.S.
securities market offers the best and most competitive securities products
available in the world.
President Obama's regulatory overhaul builds upon and strengthens
the foundation of Roosevelt's New Deal securities regulation, yet differs in
some material respects from both Roosevelt's overhaul and President
George W. Bush's 2008 regulatory reform proposal.70 So any serious
analysis of the Obama proposal's affect on broker-dealers necessarily
requires context in the form of an overview of the reasoning and historical
6 See id.
69 "When the pendulum last swung in favor of stronger enforcement, after the
Enron and WorldCom prosecutions, business groups including the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce said aggressive enforcement was driving U.S. Companies offshore."
See Scannell, supra note 53; see also Kara Scannell, Panel Urges Steps to Boost
Allure of US Markets: Restructuring of SEC [Is] Among Proposals, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 2007, at Al. Even then-Governor Spitzer ceded this point. See Press
Release, Sen. Charles Schumer, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Schumer/Bloomberg
Report: NY in Danger of Losing Status As World Financial Center Within 10
Years Without Major Shift in Regulation and Policy (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with
The Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal); see also Gregory M. Drahuschak,
Investor Protection Act Had Its Consequences, Prrr. TRIB. REv., Nov. 19, 2006
("[Most] tangible evidence of the consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, is the
number of companies going public on foreign exchanges instead of the U.S.").
7o THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANcIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter Bush Whitepaper].
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background underlying the relevant parts of the regulatory proposals of
Presidents Roosevelt and Bush that affect broker-dealers. So that is where
this Article begins.
II. How WE GOT HERE: AN OVERVIEW OF WHAT LED TO THE
CURRENT SECURITIES PATCHWORK AND OVERLAP, FROM ROOSEVELT
To G.W. BUSH
The current securities regulatory system is a product of historical
development "rather than a single overarching rationale."" "As a result, it
reflects the accumulation of decades of legislative and regulatory
developments that have largely expanded, rather than streamlined, the set of
laws, rules, and procedures that apply to securities markets and market
participants."72 Currently, there exists a patchwork of federal, state, and
industry regulators "operating under a myriad of state and federal laws."7
But it all started with the first enforceable standards and duties under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which still
govern the securities industry today.7 4
A. 1934 Foundation - In Response to the Stock Market Crash of
1929 and Resulting Great Depression, President Roosevelt
Creates the Securities and Exchange Commission and Securities
Laws in Order to Create Standards Higher than Caveat Emptor
and Empower the Securities Industry to Self Regulate Standards
of Conduct for Broker Dealers Outside of Federal Legislation
After the fallout from the 1929 stock market crash and resulting
Great Depression, President Roosevelt proposed legislation that would
protect the investing public and elevate business standards in the securities
brokerage industry. The result was the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, passed by the 73rd Congress. 75 The '33
Securities Act "focuses on the issuance and initial registration of
71 Id. at 52.
72 id.
7 Id.
74 See id. at 54. Technically, the first set of securities laws and duties were
proposed in the Uniform Sales of Securities Act in 1929, which was promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
But only a handful of states adopted this Act before Congress enacted the '33 and
'34 securities acts, which rendered the NCCUSL's efforts obsolete. Id.
7 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1994).
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securities," while the '34 Exchange Act "focuses on transactions in
securities and the regulation of the securities industry."76 Broker dealers
were and are regulated under the '34 Exchange Act. Before the Great
Depression, there were no standards governing the conduct of those selling
securities to the public. Roosevelt and Congress used the 1934 Exchange
Act to raise the standard of professional conduct in the securities industry
from the standardless principle of caveat emptorn to a "clearer
understanding of the ancient truth" that brokers managing "other people's
money" should be subject to professional trustee duties.7 8 But neither
Roosevelt nor Congress wanted the federal government to regulate the
brokerage industry on a wide scale.7 9  This was because industry
participants were seen as better able to more quickly respond to regulatory
problems given their expertise and intimate knowledge of the securities
industry.o
These New Deal Acts were a compromise - federal law would
elevate industry standards from caveat emptor, yet preserve the self
regulation of the industry that existed before the Acts, but do so "within a
legal framework that assured the enforcement of higher industry
standards."81  So self-regulatory organizations (SROs) were empowered
with initial regulatory authority, "subject to federal oversight of the [SEC],"
a new federal agency created by Section 4 of the '34 Act.82  SROs were
empowered under the Act to create and enforce rules and standards
governing the securities and brokerage industry.
Congress and President Roosevelt intended the self-regulation
mandate to permit SROs to create standards of conduct to protect investors
without Congress legislating those standards. To accomplish this hands-off
approach, and consistent with the theme of self-regulation, the '34 Act
rejects merit regulation of securities, and is premised instead "on the
disclosure of material facts relating to securities, rather than their intrinsic
financial merit."" In other words, the government did not want to prohibit
76 Bush Whitepaper, supra note 70, at 56.
77 See Caveat Emptor, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Caveat emptor is
a Latin phrase meaning "let the buyer beware." Caveat emptor is an old property
law doctrine under which a buyer could not recover from the seller for defects in
the property that rendered it unfit for ordinary purposes. The only exception was if
the seller actively concealed latent defects).
78 Ramirez, supra note 1,.at 534 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933)).
7 See id at 540.8 1 Id at 548.81 Id. at 528.82 d
3 Id at 540.
8 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended
Securities: An Agency Theory ofBroker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 535,
586-87 (2005); see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 534.
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or encourage the sale of any specific securities, and instead sought only to
ensure that the people or entities selling them adequately disclosed the
appropriate facts and terms of the product being sold.
There is no mention of the term fiduciary in the Act's statutory
scheme mandating general industry standards for broker-dealers. Not only
that, the legislative history and President Roosevelt's language supporting
the Act evince "an intent to avoid invoking the term."85 For a variety of
reasons - lack of government expertise, lack of government resources,
avoiding government bureaucracy - Roosevelt felt that the SROs and
states were best positioned to create standards to govern broker-dealers.8 6
"Imposing broad fiduciary obligations or detailed statutory mandates [on
broker dealers] would frustrate the foundations of self-regulation."
1. Broker-Dealers Generally Were Not Subject to a
Fiduciary Duty Because They Were Viewed as Arm's-
Length Salesman Rather Than Agents Providing Advice -
The Suitability Standard is Born
At the time the '34 Act was passed, broker-dealers performed
clearly defined functions, which are defined under the Act: a "broker"
"effected transactions in securities for the accounts of others," while a
"dealer" bought and sold securities for his own account. 8 Brokers filled a
customer's buy order by going into the market and purchasing designated
securities "from an exchange specialist or an over-the-counter market-
maker."89  As such, courts treated brokers as agents of their principal
customers before enactment of the '34 Act, and thus applied fiduciary
principles to impose duties of care and loyalty on stockbrokers. 90 But
"dealers" filled a customer's order by selling the customer securities from
the dealer's own inventory of securities. Thus a dealer and customer are
acting at arm's-length as buyer and seller, or principal to principal, and
85 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 547.
86 See id. at 548.
87 Id.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (2006); see also Angela Hung, Noreen Clancy, Jeff
Dominitz, Eric Talley, Claude Berrebi, & Farrukh Suvankulow, Perspectives on
Investment Advisers and Broker Dealers, RAND Study, supra note 39, at 7; see
also Gedicks, supra note 84, at 550 & n.47.
89 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 552.
90 See Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations ofBroker-Dealer
Liability for Breach ofFiduciary Duty, 23 J. CoRP. L. 65, 77 (1997) (providing a
summary of the historical development of brokers and dealers before the '33 and
'34 securities acts).
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"were regarded as being in an adverse contractual relationship in which
agency principles did not apply."9' So a dealer, acting as a principal rather
than an agent, owed only ordinary duties of care to the customer, not
fiduciary duties.92
With the support of the securities brokerage industry, Congress
passed the Maloney Act in 1938 to extend the SEC's authority to over-the-
counter broker-dealers, and not just those that were exchange members.
The Malony Act, and the self-regulation authority under the '34 Act, gave
rise to the primary SRO regulating the vast majority of broker-dealers today
- the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), reconstituted as
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2007." Congress
amended the '34 Act with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, which
required the NASD to promulgate specific rules and standards of conduct
governing broker-dealers.9 4
In the 1960s, the "suitability" obligation emerged as the industry
standard governing broker-dealers. 95 The suitability standard was ultimately
codified by the NASD. Consistent with the historical definitions of brokers
and dealers and the policy of self-regulation underlying the '34 Act, the
NASD created NASD Rule 2310 to govern the conduct of broker-dealers: if
a broker-dealer recommends that a customer purchase, sell, or exchange a
security, he must have a reasonable belief that his recommendation is
suitable for the customer by informing himself of the customer's financial
and tax status, investment objectives, risk tolerances, and "such other
information used or considered to be reasonable . . . in making
recommendations to the customer."9 6 This has been called "customer-
specific" suitability.97
A "second dimension"8 of suitability has been identified, dubbed
"reasonable-basis" suitability.9 Unlike customer-specific suitability,
reasonable-basis suitability focuses on the suitability of the security product
sold, rather than on the individual customer who purchased it. A security
product passes the reasonable basis suitability test if the broker-dealer has a
reasonable belief that the security purchased by the customer is suitable for
9' Gedicks, supra note 84, at 553 & n.56 (quoting Weiss, supra note 90, at 67).
92 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 553.
93 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 537 (in 2007, FINRA was created as a consolidation of
the NASD and the "member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)"); see also RAND Study, supra note 39, at
7 & n.3.
"See Ramirez, supra note 1.
9s Gedicks, supra note 84, at 543.
96 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 541 (quoting Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers Manual,
Conduct R. 2310 (2003)).
97 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 547-48.
9 Id. at 549.
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somebody.99 In other words, a broker-dealer only violates reasonable basis
suitability if he "recommends a security that no rational person would
purchase - that is, which is unsuitable for any investor"'0
A broker dealer's "suitability obligation under Rule 2310 applies
only to securities that have been recommended by the" broker-dealer.' 0'
So, if a customer wants to purchase a security and the broker-dealer did not
recommend it, there is no express duty on the broker-dealer to ensure that
that the security is suitable for the customer.
The suitability rule, on its face, does not impose fiduciary duties on
broker-dealers. In other words, broker-dealers can effect securities
transactions for customers that pose conflicts of interest or are not in the
customer's best interest, but only if the securities are suitable for the
customer given the customer's background and risk tolerance, and then
only if the broker-dealer recommends the security. Currently, broker-
dealers arc compensated in various ways that pose multiple conflicts of
interests with customers: they are paid by the issuers, underwriters, and
sponsors of the securities products they sell (e.g. insurance companies
sponsoring variable annuities); they earn higher commissions for selling
certain (sometimes riskier) securities over other (sometimes less volatile)
securities; and they may earn a commission for each security purchased or
trade effected for the customer, among other conflicts. But as long as the
broker-dealer does not recommend the sale, or recommends the sale of a
security suitable for the customer, these conflicts of interest are not
unlawful.
The rationale for not imposing fiduciary duties on broker-dealers
under the suitability rule is based on the rationale underlying the job
descriptions of broker-dealers at the time the '33 and '34 Acts were enacted
- broker-dealers merely bought and sold securities, they did not offer or
provide investment advice to customers as part of their primary duties. So
they were not agents or fiduciaries of their customers like investment
advisers were in the 1930s and 1940s.
99 See id.
1o Id It is postured that violating this reasonable basis standard requires fairly
egregious conduct, such as "recommending securities of a thinly traded shell
corporation with no operations, earnings, or assets, or by recommending securities
that purport to guarantee an unreasonably high rate of return." Id. at 42 n.36
(citing F. Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving
Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BuFF. L. REv. 435, 437 (1977)).
101 See National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members 96-
60 (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pO 16905.pdf.
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2. Investment Advisers Were (and Are) Subject to Fiduciary
Duties as Legislated by Congress and Interpreted by the
Supreme Court
In addition to "brokers" and "dealers," Roosevelt and Congress had
a third class of financial intermediaries to regulate - "investment
advisers." But unlike broker-dealers, investment advisers were viewed as
providing investment advice and counsel to what were perceived as largely
less knowledgeable retail customers. Investment advisers therefore were
envisioned as having superior knowledge than, and thus greater
responsibility for, their customers. In addition, various imposters posing as
investment advisers were operating on the unregulated fringe of the
industry, offering "tips" as opposed to bona fide investment advice. These
"tipsters" would "crash in on the good will of these reputable organizations
... by giving themselves a designation of investment counselors." 0 2
President Roosevelt and Congress therefore saw the need to more
directly regulate investment advisers and subject them to more onerous
fiduciary duties. So Congress passed the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.103 The Act "regulates the collection of financial professions that
typically includes financial planners, money managers, and investment
consultants." 1 4 The Act defines an investment adviser as:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others . . . as to the value of securities
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities.'os
Congress specifically excludes from the definition of investment adviser
"any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who
102 Certain Broker Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-51523, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424 (Apr. 19, 2005). The SEC Release
provides a decent history of the SEC's Investment Counsel Report to Congress
detailing its study of the investment adviser industry from 1935 and 1939. The
SEC's Study was the subject of congressional hearings that would become the
outline for the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. But SEC Release No. 34-51523
proposed a rule excepting broker-dealer fee arrangements from the purview of the
1940 Act, which was struck down by a D.C. circuit court of appeals. See
discussion infra Part II.E for a detailed analysis of this Release.
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1- 21. Congress also passed the corresponding Investment
Companies Act of 1940 to regulate investment companies that employed
investment advisers. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1- 64.
' RAND Study, supra note 39, at 12.
'0o 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1).
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receives no special compensation therefore." 06 Thus, in 1934 and 1940,
Congress viewed broker-dealers as merely order clerks "effecting
transactions in securities," and investment advisers as being compensated
for providing advice and analyses of securities as part of their regular
business. That is how the statute reads today. So if a broker-dealer today is
paid "special compensation" for providing investment advice that is not
"solely incidental" to his selling or buying securities, then he is considered
an investment adviser and compelled to comply with the Investment
Advisers Act. 07 This has significant consequences.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prescribes a fiduciary
obligation on all investment advisers to their clients as a categorical
matter.' So an investment adviser must act solely "with the client's
investment goals and interests in mind, free from any direct or indirect
conflicts of interest that would tempt the adviser to make recommendations
that would also benefit him or her," including any practice in which an
adviser has a pecuniary interest in recommending a transaction to a client,
through, for example, "fees or profits generated in another commercial
relationship, finder's fees, outside commissions or bonuses."' 09  And
because the duties in the Act apply to prospective as well as current clients,
the Act even prescribes as deceptive any advertising that violates these
duties and standards."10
The Investment Advisers Act also prescribes more onerous
registration, reporting, and bookkeeping obligations and other
requirements."' For example, an investment adviser managing at least $25
million in assets must register with the SEC using the voluminous and
detailed Form ADV, which must be filed at least annually and in some
cases more frequently.!"2 Part I of the ADV "contains information about
10 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
107 See discussion infra Part II.E, addressing whether brokerage-fee accounts
constitute special compensation for advisory services, the 2005 SEC rule declaring
they did not, and the 2007 court decision saying they do and thus vacating the 2005
SEC rule.
los RAND Study, supra note 39, at 13. The words "fiduciary duty" do not appear
in the Investment Advisers Act. In 1963, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act's
"manifest purpose" to impose a fiduciary duty on investment advisers. See Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180, 192, 283 (1963).
109 RAND Study, supra note 39, at 13.
"
0 Id. at 13.
"'. Id. at 12-14.
112 Id. at 12; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Form ADV),
available at www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm. The SEC is currently accepting
comments on a proposal to revise its Form ADV to add more "meaningful"
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the adviser's education, business and disciplinary history within the last ten
years," and Part 2 "includes information on an adviser's services, fees, and
investment strategies," including whether the adviser or any related person
executes trades as a broker-dealer, and whether any of those brokerage
accounts are discretionary. All Form ADVs are accessible by the general
public for review." 3  According to the SEC's Director of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations, inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading
statements in Forms ADV comprise half of the inadequate disclosure
deficiencies found in SEC examinations and investigations of advisers
under the Investment Advisers Act." 4 Compare this to the relatively short
Form U-4s currently required to be submitted by registered representatives
of broker-dealers, which are published only to securities industry
participants and not to the investing public."'
B. Fifty State Securities Laws and Regulators ofBroker-Dealers and
Eventual Preemption by Congress, the '34 Exchange Act, and the
NASD
The first modern state securities law was enacted by Kansas in
1911.116 Over the years, many other states enacted securities laws patterned
after the Kansas statute. These early state statutes were forms of "merit"
regulation in which state administrators "wielded broad, subjective
discretion in determining the securities permitted to be registered."ll 7
Today, all fifty states and U.S. territories have statutes regulating securities,
called "Blue Sky Laws.""'8  But today's state securities laws do not
subjectively evaluate the merits of individual securities; rather, they enact a
disclosures of an investment adviser's business practices and conflicts of interest.
See Amendments to Form ADV, SEC Release No. IA-271 1,Investment Advisor
Act No. 34-57419, 2008 SEC LEXIS 466 (Mar. 3, 2008).
" RAND Study, supra note 39, at 12.
114 Lori Richards, Director of SEC Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
Speech at Eighth Annual Investment Adviser Compliance Summit (Feb 27, 2006).
"' "The Form U-4 (Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer Registration) ... [is]
used by broker-dealers to register . .. associated persons with self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), and jurisdictions." FINRA - Current Uniform Registration
Forms for Electronic Filing in Web CRD,
http://www.finra.org/industry/compliance/registration/crd/filingguidance/p005235.
116 Bush Whitepaper, supra note 70, at 53.
" Id. at 53.
118 The origin of the term "blue sky" is thought to have emanated from Justice
McKenna's opinion in the Supreme Court case styled Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539 (1917), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of state
securities regulations to prevent fraud: "The name that is given to the law indicates
the evil at which it is aimed, that is, to use the language of a cited case, 'speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'. . . ."
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disclosure-based approach akin to the current federal securities laws." 9
Broker dealers and investment advisers must register with the relevant state
securities regulator or agency unless an exception applies. Like the SEC,
its state counterparts can regulate, investigate, and prosecute violations of
the state's securities laws.
In 1956, seeing a need to coordinate and make uniform the
individual states different regulatory schemes, the Uniform Securities Act
was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL).1 20 A majority of states enacted the 1956 Act. The
Act was amended in 1985, but only six states adopted that amendment. The
Uniform Securities Act was again revised in 2002. This version was
adopted by thirteen states, and provides for registration and supervision of
broker-dealers and investment advisers.121 Currently, various states are
again amending their Uniform Securities Acts in coincidence with the
current federal regulatory overhaul.
State regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers was
substantially curtailed in 1996, when Congress passed the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) in order to reduce the
complex and duplicative regulation among state and federal regulators. To
achieve this, NSMIA amended the federal securities laws to preempt many
state securities laws. It also "substantially curtailed states' rulemaking and
supervisory authority over broker-dealers. Though states [can] still require
broker-dealer registration, the SEC and [FINRA] .. . carry out most broker-
dealer regulation."l 22  The regulatory overhaul of the securities laws
proposed by the Obama Administration has the potential to strip FINRA of
its current jurisdiction to make and enforce rules, and arbitrate disputes of
those rules.
" Bush Whitepaper, supra note 70, at 53.
12o Id. at 54. The NCCUSL enacted the first Uniform Securities Act in 1929. But
the Act was adopted by only a handful of states, and was rendered obsolete with the
enactment of the 1933 Securities Act.
121 Another organization committed to uniformity in state securities laws is the
North American Securities Administration Association, Inc. (NASAA). NASAA
was founded in 1919, and represents all state securities regulators in the U.S.
NASAA works to coordinate the regulation and enforcement activity of its
members, as well as coordinate state legislative and regulatory initiatives with
Congress and the SEC. See id.
122 Id. at 55.
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C. Starting in the 1970's, Courts Impose More Rigorous Standards
for Securities Fraud Liability Under the '34 Exchange Act that
Make Suitability Claims against Broker-Dealers More Onerous
There exists no express or implied private right of action under the
'34 Exchange Act for violations of FINRA's suitability or other rules.12 3 So
before the advent and Supreme Court-approval of industry arbitration
agreements in the 1970's, most suitability claims were brought as section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 implied private rights of action. 124 A broker-dealer
was liable if it made a material misrepresentation or omission in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security to a customer.12 5 But at the same
time suitability claims were finding their legs under the securities laws in
the 1970s, courts were imposing substantial limits on implied private rights
of action under the federal securities laws. The most significant barriers to
implied private actions were the requirements that plaintiffs plead and
prove scienter - that a broker had a specific intent to defraud plaintiffs -
and that plaintiffs reasonably relied on the broker's material
misrepresentation. 126
These new requirements made suitability claims notoriously
difficult to plead and prove under the Exchange Act because rarely will a
broker fail to perform basic due diligence on the customer or the security to
render a recommendation intentionally fraudulent, even under the relaxed
123 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 562 & n.91 (citing MARC 1. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.03[2] (2000); Barbara Black & Jill I.
Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role ofLaw in Securities Arbitration,
23 CARDOzo L. REv. 991, 1025 (2002)).
124 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 562; see also, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971) (noting that it is "established
that a private right of action is implied under §10(b)" and Rule 1 Ob-5); Leib v.
Merrill Lynch, 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (still the seminal case
analyzing a broker-dealer's suitability duties, and when those become fiduciary
duties). Aggrieved investors have also recovered on federal and state law fraud,
fiduciary duty, and negligence theories of broker-dealer breaches of the suitability
standards. See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 543 & n.22. Rule 10b-5 was adopted by
the SEC in 1942. See also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172.
125 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 563. See also Leib, 461 F. Supp. 951 (opining that a
broker has the following duties on a single transaction in a non-discretionary
account: "(1) the duty to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to
become informed as to its nature, price and financial prognosis; (2) the duty to
carry out the customer's orders promptly in a manner best suited to serve the
customer's interests; (3) the duty to inform the customer of the risks involved in
purchasing or selling a particular security;(4) the duty to refrain from self-dealing
or refusing to disclose any personal interest the broker may have in a particular
recommended security; (5) the duty not to misrepresent any fact material to the
transaction.") (internal citations omitted).
126 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 563.
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"reckless" intent standard that has been adopted by some federal circuits.127
At most, typical plaintiffs could show that a broker's judgment was wrong,
but this only amounts to negligence, which is always insufficient to support
a misrepresentation or omission claim under the Exchange Act. 128 If the
broker establishes that he disclosed the risk that his recommendation may
be unsuitable, formally or informally, the plaintiffs cannot prove reliance. 2 9
Consequently, stand-alone suitability claims became rare, with
recovery for such claims even rarer still.130 Instead, they were typically
included as "add-on" counts for Rule 1Ob-5 claims involving more
egregious broker-dealer conduct, such as "churning a discretionary account,
ignoring customer orders in a nondiscretionary account, or converting or
otherwise mishandling account funds."' 3 ' Attempting to avoid the high
pleading bar under the Exchange Act, plaintiffs began arguing that a
broker's unauthorized trading and churning created a de facto discretionary
account,132 which raised the broker's standard of care from suitability to
fiduciary duty. It is much easier for plaintiffs to prove an intentional or
reckless violation of a discretionary account.133 And reliance is essentially
presumed in a discretionary account.
127 Some federal circuits hold that the intent element of a securities fraud claim
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is satisfied if plaintiffs plead and prove that a
defendant was reckless in making his misrepresentation, which has been defined as
"an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." S.E.C. v. George, 426
F.3d 786, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
128 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 563-64; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976) (holding that section 10(b), and therefore Rule 1Ob-5, do not reach
negligent conduct); see also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-74.
129 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 564.
130 See id. at 654.
131 Id.
132 See Leib, 461 F. Supp. 951 (A discretionary account is one where the broker
exercises discretion and control over the customer's investments. A broker owes a
fiduciary duty to customers with discretionary accounts. Typically, a written
customer agreement is needed to create an express discretionary account. But
plaintiffs arguing the existence of a de facto discretionary account argue that a
broker is alleged to have usurped actual control of a non-discretionary account,
thus effectively making it a discretionary account subject to heightened fiduciary
duties.).
' See Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 953 (opining that a broker with a discretionary account
must 1) actively manage the account in accord with the customer's interests and
objectives; 2) keep himself informed of all changes in the market that affect the
customer's investment interests; 3) keep the customer informed as to every
transaction the broker completes; and 4) "explain forthrightly the practical impact
and potential risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged.").
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D. The 1980s Begin the Blurring of the Line Between Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers - The Supreme Court Permits
Broker-Dealers to Execute Customer Agreements With
Provisions Requiring Private Binding Arbitration ofRetail
Securities Disputes, Eliminating Pleading Barriers for Suitability
Claims But Preventing Public Development ofSuitability
Standards that Kept Pace With Evolving Global Markets,
Products, and Compensation Structures Facing Broker-Dealers
In 1987 and 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability,
"under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, of contractual provisions mandating
arbitration of claims by customers against broker-dealers." 34 These
decisions were significant in several respects. First, broker-dealers added
mandatory arbitration provisions to all their customer agreements, and the
New York Stock Exchange and the NASD created arbitration rules and
forums to handle customer claims under these provisions.'35 As a result,
most customer disputes with broker-dealers to date have been resolved
through private, binding arbitration. And, because FINRA arbitration
awards are neither reasoned nor published, the suitability standards
governing broker-dealers have not been developed to keep pace with the
changing landscape of the global securities market and products. This is
manifest by the fact that the seminal case analyzing the suitability versus
fiduciary standards for broker dealers was published in 1978.136 Because
the suitability standard was not officially published until the 1960's, there
was little time for it to develop in the courts before it was relegated to the
realm of mostly non-reasoned, non-published industry arbitration decisions
beginning in the late 1980s.
Broker-dealers complain that arbitrators have ignored the strict
pleading requirements of section 10(b) in adjudicating suitability claims,
and instead issue damage awards to customers based on equitable
134 Gedicks, supra note 84, at 564 & n. 102 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-84 (1989) (upholding arbitration
provision under the '33 Act), and Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 234-40 (1987) (upholding arbitration provision under the '34 Act)). Since
1817, well before securities arbitration received the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court, the New York Stock Exchange has permitted its members to arbitrate
disputes between them. In 1829 the NYSE "expanded the jurisdiction of its arbitral
forum to hear disputes between individual investors and members firms." SIFMA,
WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 6 (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.sifna.org/regulatory/pdflarbitration-white-paper.pdf
[hereinafter SIFMA Whitepaper].
135 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 564.
"3 See Leib, 461 F. Supp. 951 (still the seminal case analyzing a broker-dealer's
suitability duties, and when those become fiduciary duties).
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considerations such as compliance with industry ethics, consideration of
which would otherwise be barred under a strict legal analysis.' In its 2007
whitepaper on securities arbitration provisions, the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)'38 confirmed that recent Supreme
Court opinions increasing the burden to survive a motion to dismiss "make
certain that investors are far more likely to have their claims dismissed in
court than in arbitration, where dismissals are rare."' 39  Whereas the
"[r]elaxed pleading standards in securities arbitration encourage disputes to
be filed." 4 0
So the chances of a customer recovering on a suitability claim were
substantially increased with the advent of arbitration and concomitant
consideration of ethics and equity over the strict pleading requirements of
the '34 Act.141 Moreover, arbitration awards are rarely overturned because
of the onerous legal standard to do so, combined with the fact that most
awards are not reasoned opinions.14 2
E. 2005, The Beginning of the End For Suitability - Federal
Courts Reject the SEC's Attempt to Exempt Broker Dealers
Offering Brokerage-Fee Accounts From the Fiduciary Duties
Imposed by the Investment Advisers Act
On April 12, 2005, the SEC issued a rule entitled "Certain Broker-
Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers." 43 The 2005 Rule
13 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 565-66.
138 SIFMA represents the interests of over 600 securities firms. "SIFMA's mission
is to champion policies and practices that benefit investors and issuers, expand and
perfect global capital markets and foster the development of new products and
services. Fundamental to achieving this mission is earning, inspiring and
upholding the public's trust in the industry and the markets." Industry Perspectives
on the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Svcs, 111th Cong. (July 17, 2009) (testimony of
Randolph C. Cook, Executive V.P., SIFMA) [hearinafter Hearings].
1 SIFMA Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 3. SIFMA notes in its Whitepaper that
twenty percent of all arbitration claims are heard on the merits, compared with
1.5% of civil claims that are heard and decided by a judge or jury. See id.
140 Id. at 3.
141 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 565-66. The statistics bear this out; the
"percentage of securities arbitration claimants who recover - either by award or
settlement - has held steady in recent years, and in 2006 was 66 percent." SIFMA
Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 4.
142 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 565.
143 Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisors, Advisors
Act Release No. IA-2333, 72056, 17 C.F.R. Part 275 and 279 (2004).
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attempted to address the increasingly popular fee-based accounts offered by
broker-dealers. "Fee-based accounts allow for registered representatives to
be compensated based on the amount of assets in an account regardless of
the transaction activity."'" The rise of fee-based brokerage accounts was
the result of three things: 1) increased competition in the brokerage
industry; 2) decrease in transaction-based commissions; and 3) a 1995
report commissioned by the SECl45 that identified fee-based accounts as a
best practice to avoid conflicts of interest because they decreased incentives
to chum accounts, recommend unsuitable yet profitable securities, or use
high-pressure sales tactics.146
The Advisers Act exempts broker-dealers from its definition of
investment adviser if the broker's advisery services are "solely incidental"
to its brokerage business, and it does not receive "special compensation" for
the advisery services.147 If broker-dealers offer advisery services that are
not incidental or are paid special compensation for the advice, then they
would have to treat their customers as adviser customers with the
incumbent fiduciary and disclosure duties: this would result in precluding
the sale of many traditional brokerage products.
Fee-based brokerage programs typically offered a suite of services
for which a customer paid a fee based on the total assets in the account,
including services like execution, investment advice, arranging for delivery
and payment, and custodial and recordkeeping services.148 This was
different than traditional commission or transaction-based broker-dealer
compensation arrangements. Therefore, these fee-based programs generated
a debate about whether broker-dealers offering them were being paid
"special compensation" for advisery services, and thus satisfying the
definition of an investment adviser under the Act. 14 9
Significantly, and contrary to the current Obama proposal, the SEC
in 2005 rejected the proposal to employ a uniform fiduciary standard for
investment advisers and broker-dealers offering fee-based accounts. The
SEC acknowledged that "the lines between full service broker-dealers and
investment advisers continue to blur, but we do not believe that requiring
most or all full-service broker-dealers to treat most or all of their customer
4 RAND Study, supra note 88, at 2.
145 The Tulley-Levitt report was commissioned by then SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt in response to concerns about conflicts of interest in the retail brokerage
industry. RAND Study, supra 88, at 2.
4 RAND Study, supra note 88, at 2.
147 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)( 11)(C) (2006).
148 RAND Study, supra note 88, at 15.
149 It was this proposed SEC rule that caused the SEC to commission the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice to study investor and industry perspectives on investment
advisers and broker dealers, which was published under this name in 2008, after the
D.C. Circuit's opinion. See RAND Study, supra note 88.
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accounts as advisory accounts is an appropriate response to this
blurring."5s
So the SEC crafted a regulation..' that exempted from the Advisers
Act broker-dealers offering fee-based brokerage accounts as long as the
broker-dealer: "1) does not charge a separate fee for advisory services; 2)
does not provide advice as part of a financial plan or in connection with
financial planning services; 3) does not exercise investment discretion over
any customer accounts; and 4) includes the following statement in any
advertisements" or account-related documents:
Your account is a brokerage account and not an advisory
account. Our interests may not always be the same as
yours. Please ask us questions to make sure you
understand your rights and our obligations to you,
including the extent of our obligations to disclose conflicts
of interest and to act in your best interest. We are paid both
by you and, sometimes, by people who compensate us
based on what you buy. Therefore, our profits, and our
salespersons' compensation, may vary by product over
time.152
In short, the SEC would permit broker-dealers offering incidental
investment advice to sell securities that conflicted with the customer's
interest as long as the broker-dealer tells the customer in clear terms that
they are not fiduciaries of the broker-dealer. The SEC's proposed rule also
expressly provided that broker-dealers offering financing planning services
- the tax, accounting, insurance, estate planning, and investment advice
traditionally the province of investment advisers - would not be
considered rendering advice incidental to brokerage services and thus
would be regulated as fiduciaries under the Investment Advisers Act.s 3
so Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg.
74, 20424 (Apr. 19, 2005). In 2009 and 2010, the SEC under President Obama has
changed its position, and advocates a uniform fiduciary standard for broker dealers
and advisers. See, e.g. Malini Manickavasagam, Aguilar Urges Congress to Extend
Fiduciary Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at
571-72 (Mar. 29, 2010) (noting opinion of SEC Commissioner Aguilar that the
existing fiduciary standard as developed under the Advisers Act should also govern
broker dealers).
.' 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1 1)-1 (2006).
152 See RAND Study, supra note 88, at 1; Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to
be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 74, 20424.
153 See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed.
Reg. 74, 20424.
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This attempt by the SEC to extend the broker-dealer exemption in
the Advisers Act was met with much criticism, chief of which was that
consumers would be more confused than ever about the difference between
broker-dealers and investment advisers, and that broker-dealers would
provide investment advice but at the same time be permitted to sell more
profitable brokerage products that violated traditional fiduciary duties.154
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the critics
and rejected the SEC's attempt to exempt from the Investment Advisers
Act, and its accompanying fiduciary obligations, broker-dealers that receive
special compensation for offering fee based accounts in connection with
financial advisery services.15 5 This was a clear forecast that courts were not
going to honor any artificial or non-statutory-based distinctions between
broker-dealers and advisers in order to absolve broker-dealers from the
plain language and incumbent duties intended by Congress in enacting the
Investment Advisers Act. Congress attempts to legislate the DC Circuit's
holding in the Investor Protection Act, and then some. 56
F. 2008 Reaction to Market Meltdown Caused by Sub-Prime
Mortgage-Backed Securities: G. W Bush Issues a Detailed
"Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure"
After the initial market meltdown caused by the sub-prime
mortgage disaster, the Bush Administration published its own Whitepaper
in March 2008 outlining an overhaul to the financial regulatory system.5 7
The Bush Whitepaper acknowledged the need to align the current
patchwork of "[flederal, state, and industry regulators, operating under the
authorities of a myriad of state and federal laws, carry[ing] out securities
regulation in the United States."'5s There are many similarities between the
Bush and Obama Whitepaper proposals, such as the creation of a new
consumer financial protection agency.'59 But they are materially different
when it comes to regulation affecting broker dealers and investment
advisers: Bush sought to significantly reduce the role and authority of the
154 See, e.g, Bob Veres, False Fiduciaries: The so-called resolution of the SEC's
'Merrill Lynch rule' does nothing to keep brokers from providing financial advice
without assuming legal responsibility, FIN. PLANNING 37, 40 (May 2006).
15s See Fin. Planning Assoc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 481, 492 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (holding that the 2005 Rule exceeded the SEC's rulemaking authority by
improperly expanding the broker-dealer exception in the Adviser's Act beyond a
reasonable interpretation of the exception contained in the Act).
156 See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
157 See Bush Whitepaper, supra note 70.
'
5 1 d. at 52.
" Id. at 14. The Bush Treasury dubbed the consumer protection entity a business
conduct regulator and called it the Conduct of Business Regulatory Financial
Agency.
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SEC,160 while Obama proposes to enhance it;161 Bush sought to go even
further than Roosevelt with self-regulation of the retail securities industry
by seeking to govern investment advisers with similar self regulatory
organizations and standards that currently govern broker-dealers,162 while
Obama proposes to treat broker dealers just like investment advisers.163
. The shift by the Obama Administration from abrogating to
strengthening the SEC, and from imposing self-regulation on investment
advisers to imposing investment adviser duties on broker dealers, is the
result of the public outcry over the revelation of the Bernie Madoff scheme,
which revealed various deficiencies in the way the SEC investigated and
prosecuted fraud in connection with retail securities sold to the public,
costing public investors billions of dollars." When the Bush Whitepaper
was published pre-Madoff, non-mortgage securities products were the
darlings of Wall Street because they were seen as "real" wealth generators,
as opposed to the unchecked and largely valueless sub-prime mortgage-
backed securities. The failings of retail securities regulation and
supervision in connection with the Madoff mess changed this view for the
public and the new Obama Administration. Madoff was seen as exploiting
the SEC's regulatory gap between Madoff's broker-dealer registration and
FINRA oversight, and his later registration as an investment adviser subject
to SEC oversight.165
1o Id at 20-21.
161 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 8, 15, 70-73.
162 Bush Whitepaper, supra note 70, at 20, 126, 178.
163 Obama Whitepaper, supra, note 3 at 71-72. But see, H.R. 4173, §§
7107(a)(2)(B), 7208(g) (authorizing the SEC to designate "one or more self-
regulatory organizations," or a "national securities organization," to "augment" the
SEC's efforts to regulate investment advisers).
16 See Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 70.
165 See Thomas P. Lemke & Steven W. Stone, The Madoff "Opportunity:"
Harmonizing the Overarching Standard of Care for Financial Professionals Who
Give Investment Advice, 13 WALL ST. LAWYER 4 (2009); see also Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Madoff, Bernhard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, Civ. 08 CV 10791 (LLS)
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. DiPascali, Jr., Civ. 09 CV 7085 (LLS)
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also 155 CONG. REC. H14747, 14748-49 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
2009) (statement of Reps. Cohen & Bachus).
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III. 2009 REACTION TO SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY FAILURES
OVER SALES OF SUB-PRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES AND
BERNIE MADOFF'S MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR FRAUD ON RETAIL
SECURITIES CUSTOMERS
A. Fiduciary Duty: Obama and Congress Propose a Uniform
Fiduciary Standard for Broker Dealers and Investment Advisers
to Unblur the Now Artificial Distinction between Modern Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers
The Obama Whitepaper acknowledges that there is no longer a
meaningful difference between the broker-dealer that provides "incidental
advice" on securities, and the investment adviser who provides "primary
advice," as existed in the 30's and 40's.166 The Obama Whitepaper
concludes that "[rietail customers repose the same degree of trust in their
brokers as they do in investment advisers, but the legal responsibilities may
not be the same."l 67  Most importantly, FINRA and SEC rules and
regulations permit broker-dealers to sell profitable securities despite
conflicts of interests with its customers, while the Investment Advisers Act,
with its related SEC rules and regulations, do not. The Obama
Administration proposes to rectify this defined inequity by imposing on
broker-dealers the duties and obligations currently imposed on investment
advisers; namely, both intermediaries will have a fiduciary duty.
In the Obama Whitepaper, the Treasury calls on the SEC to change
broker-dealer standards and compensation structures:
The SEC should be permitted to align duties for
intermediaries across financial products. Standards of care
for all broker dealers when providing investment advice
about securities to retail investors should be raised to the
fiduciary standard to align the legal framework with
investment advisers. In addition, the SEC should be
empowered to examine and ban forms of compensation that
encourage intermediaries to put investors into products that
166 See Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 71.
Id. Though the Obama Whitepaper provides no scientific or empirical data to
support its conclusion that investors no longer appreciate the difference between
the services provided by broker-dealers and investment advisers, the SEC
commissioned a detailed study of the issue, which culminated in the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice publishing a study which substantiated this conclusion
based on thorough empirical and statistical research and analysis. See RAND
Study, supra note 88.
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are profitable to the intermediary, but are not in the
investors' best interest. 6 8
The Obama Whitepaper suggests that new legislation "bolster investor
protections and bring important consistency to the regulation of these two
types of financial professionals by:"
* Requiring that broker-dealers who provide
investment advice about securities to investors
have the same fiduciary obligations as registered
investment advisers;
* Providing simple and clear disclosures to investors
regarding the scope of the terms of their
relationships with investment professionals; and
* Prohibiting certain conflicts of interests and sales
practices that are contrary to the interests of
investors.16 9
1. The Obama Administration Issues the Proposed Investor
Protection Act, Legislating the Fiduciary Duty Outlined in
the Whitepaper
One month after issuing its whitepaper proposing a fiduciary duty
standard for broker-dealers, the Obama Administration provided it in
legislative form when it released its draft of the Investor Protection Act of
2009 ("Investor Protection Act"). Section 913 of the Investor Protection
Act is entitled "Establishment of a Fiduciary Duty for Brokers, Dealers, and
Investment Advisers, and Harmonization of the Regulation of Brokers,
Dealers, and Investment Advisers."
Section 913 proposes to amend the '34 Exchange Act and the
Investment Advisers Act by adding a provision styled "Standards of
Conduct," which provides the SEC with authority to regulate a uniform
fiduciary duty standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers:
The Commission may promulgate rules to provide, in
substance, that the standards of conduct for all brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers, in providing investment
advice about securities to retail customers or clients (and
such other customers or clients as the Commission may by
rule provide) shall be to act solely in the interest of the
168 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 71-72.
169 Id. at 72.
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customer or client without regard to the financial or other
interest of the broker, dealer or investment adviser
providing the advice.o
The Investor Protection Act goes further than the Whitepaper by proposing
that the SEC have authority to regulate a fiduciary duty to customers or
clients "other" than retail customers or clients.
The Investor Protection Act takes yet another step further than the
Whitepaper and proposes providing the SEC with authority not only to
regulate disclosures of securities products sold by broker-dealers and
investment advisers, but also the merits of the securities, along with sales
practices and compensation structures associated with them:
The Commission shall: (1) take steps to facilitate the
provision of simple and clear disclosures to investors
regarding the terms of their relationships with investment
professionals; and (2) examine and, where appropriate,
promulgate rules prohibiting sales practices, conflicts of
interest, and compensation schemes for financial
intermediaries (including brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers) that it deems contrary to the public interest and
the interests of investors.1 7'
2. SIFMA's Position
The Executive Vice President of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association ("SIFIA")172 testified before Congress
regarding SIFMA's views on the Obama Administration's proposal to
impose a uniform fiduciary duty on broker-dealers and investment
advisers. 73 SIFMA advocates applying a uniform fiduciary duty on broker-
dealers when they provide "personalized investment advice about securities
to individual investors." 74 But SIFMA argues that broker-dealers should
not be subject to a fiduciary duty when they simply execute customer
orders, "or engage in market-making, underwriting or providing cash sweep
170 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 913(a)(k).
17' Id. § 913(k)(1)(1)-(2).
172 SIFMA represents the interests of over 600 securities firms. "SIFMA's mission
is to champion policies and practices that benefit investors and issuers, expand and
perfect global capital markets and foster the development of new products and
services. Fundamental to achieving this mission is earning, inspiring and
upholding the public's trust in the industry and the markets." Hearings, supra note
138, at 1 (statement of Randolph C. Snook, Executive V.P., SIFMA).
173 See id.
'
74 Id. at 21.
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services."'7  SIFMA does not say how this differs from the SEC's failed
attempt to make this distinction in 2005.
SIFMA argues that the "hallmark" of the new standard should be
"putting investors' interests first." It includes three general suggestions to
implement this interest: (1) financial services providers must communicate
and document in "plain English" the "duties, obligations and expectations
of the customer" and financial adviser; (2) financial advisers should "seek"
to avoid conflicts of interest; (3) and if they cannot, "they must effectively
manage conflicts through clear, unambiguous disclosure" and investor
consent. 176
But SIFMA also calls for Congress to permit broker-dealers to
continue to innovate their products, services, and capital formation in order
to provide a robust and diverse range of choices for investors. 7 7  To
facilitate this objective, SIMFA argues that investors should be permitted to
"define or modify" their relationships with their financial adviser;
presumably SIFMA advocates that investors would be able to contract
around the uniform fiduciary standard.'"8 SIFMA further advocates for
SEC rescission of its rule prohibiting principal trading,17 9 which it argues
stifles investor choice by "foreclosing opportunities for investors to obtain
more favorable pricing on transactions because of the requirement of
transaction-by-transaction consent." 80
" Id. at 21-22.
176 Id. at 22-23.
77 Id. at 23.
178 Id. at 23 ("A new federal standard thus must be sufficiently flexible to be
adapted to the products, services and advice chosen by the investor, and applied
only in the context of providing personalized investment advice about securities to
individual investors.").
179 Principal trading is where a broker-dealer sells a customer products from its own
inventory. Currently, § 206(3) of the Advisers Act requires written notice to and
approval of a customer before such a transaction is executed. See John Churchill,
SEC Principal Trading Proposal: A Stalling Tactic?, REGISTERED REP., Aug. 28,
2007,
http://registeredrep.com/securitieslaw/SECPrincipal TradeProposal-a Stalling.
180 Hearings, supra note 138, at 23 (statement of Randolph C. Snook, Executive
V.P., SIFMA).
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3. Congress Adds Teeth To and Tempers the Fiduciary Duty
Proposed by the Obama Administration
a. The House Bill
The bill proposed by the U.S. House of Representatives adopts
some of SIFMA's suggestions, and simultaneously strengthens and tempers
the conduct and disclosure regulations proposed for broker-dealers. Unlike
the Obama proposal, which says the SEC "may" promulgate a uniform
fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and investment advisers, the House
version directs that the SEC "shall" do so.' 8 ' The Obama proposal requires
broker-dealers and investment advisers to act "solely in the interest" of
customers, while the House bill requires that broker-dealers and advisers
"act in the best interest" of customers.182 The House also takes up
SIFMA's advice to impose the fiduciary duty on broker-dealers providing
"personalized" investment advice, as opposed to the Obama proposal
imposing the duty on simply "investment advice." 83 This difference does
not appear material though because both the Obama proposal and the House
181 Compare Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, §913(a)(k)), with H.R. 4173,
111th Cong., supra note 16, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1), (g)(1) (2009).
18 See H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1), (g)(1) (emphasis added). House Bill 4173
does not amend the '34 Exchange Act to add the text of this fiduciary duty; instead,
it amends the '34 Exchange Act to note that the "standard of conduct for such
broker or dealer with respect to such customer shall be the same as the standard of
conduct applicable to an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940." Id. § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1). The '40 Advisers Act is amended to provide for the
fiduciary duty standard above. See id. § 7103(a)(1)(g)(1); see also id. §
7103(b)(1)(o)(2) (authorizing the SEC to "prosecute and sanction" broker dealers
"to the same extent" it does investment advisers under the '40 Advisers Act).
H.R. 4173, §7103(a)(1)(m)(1), As discussed supra note 18, Senator Dodd's
draft bill, Restoring Financial Stability Act, is similar to HR 4173. But one area in
which it markedly differs is the scope of a broker dealer's fiduciary duty. Instead
of limiting that duty to broker's providing personalized investment advice, as does
HR 4173, it simply erases the exemption broker-dealers currently have under the
Investment Advisor's Act, "and require[s] them to register as advisors, making
them fiduciaries." Tara Siegel Bernard, Struggling Over a Rule for Brokers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010; see also SEC Reviewing Point-of-Sale Disclosures Beyond
Mutual Fund Industry, Schapiro Says, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) Vol. 42, No.
7, at 261 (Feb. 15, 2010) (SEC Chairman Schapiro remarks that the SEC is
considering imposing on broker dealers the custody controls currently imposed on
investment advisors, which will likely "have a wider impact on the industry.");
SEC Staff Mulling Recommendations for Custody Disclosures from Brokers,
Securities Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 263-64 (Feb. 15, 2010).
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bill limit the imposition of a fiduciary duty to broker-dealers offering
advice "about securities to retail customers." 84
The House bill goes further than the Obama proposal in specifying
to which retail customers broker-dealers and investment advisers will owe a
fiduciary duty:
[T]he term 'retail customer' means a natural person, or the
legal representative of such natural person, who-
(A) receives personalized investment advice about
securities from a broker or dealer;185 and
(B) uses such advice primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.186
By limiting the definition of retail customer to only "natural persons"
investing "primarily" for personal purposes, the House seems to imply that
corporate and institutional investors, including influential pension funds,
will not be covered by the Act.187 Thus, it appears that those constituents
will only be permitted a suitability standard of care. This could prove a
blow to the securities plaintiffs' bar, whose most profitable clients are
pension fund class members, who may now face a higher burden of proof
than individual plaintiffs under the Act. 88
Also interesting is that while the House bill amends both the '34
Exchange Act and the '40 Advisers Act with the above definition of retail
customer, only the '40 Advisers Act is amended with the following
language:
184 H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1), (g)(1) (emphasis added). Another seemingly
innocuous change is that Congress covers "retail customers," while the Obama
proposal covers "retail customers or clients." Congress could have simplified the
definition to simplify drafting of other provisions in the Bill defining "retail
customer."
1ss H.R. 4173, § 7103(m)(3)(A).
116 H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(3), (g)(2).
187 See, e.g., In re North (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 254-55 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (interpreting act of Congress and noting that "natural person" is
"distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association.").
188 See Mark Maremont, Tom McGinty & Nathan Koppel, Trial Lawyers
Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703837004575013633550087098.
html (examining political monetary contributions by securities plaintiffs law firms
to institutional pension fund investors that are those firms' most profitable clients
"because federal law encourages judges to pick big institutional investors for the
role" of lead plaintiffs in shareholder suits).
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[T]he Commission shall not ascribe a meaning to the term
'customer' that would include an investor in a private fund
managed by an investment adviser, where such private
fund has entered into an advisery contract with such
adviser." 9
In other words, an investment adviser who enters into an advisory contract
with an investor in a private fund, and manages that fund, will not owe a
fiduciary duty to that private fund investor.' 90 So does this mean a "natural
person" that is an investor in a private fund managed by an investment
adviser is not entitled to a fiduciary duty? What about natural persons who
are investors in public pension funds? Under this reading, only "natural
persons" are owed fiduciary duties, unless they are investors in a private
fund managed by an investment adviser.
House Bill 4173 says that the Commission "shall" prosecute and
sanction broker dealers under the '34 Exchange Act "to the same extent as the
Commission prosecutes and sanctions violators of the standard of conduct
applicable to an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940."1' Does this mean that broker dealers also do not owe fiduciary duties to
public and private funds, or to natural persons who are investors in a private
fund? Harmonious may not be the best word to describe this section, currently
dubbed "Harmonization of Enforcement." Yet these provisions were kept in the
final bill reconciling the House and Senate versions.
The House bill gives passing reference to the compensation issue
that vexed the SEC in 2005 by amending the 1934 Exchange Act to read
that:
The receipt of compensation based on commission or other
standard compensation for the sale of securities shall not,
in and of itself, be considered a violation of such standard
applied to a broker or dealer."'9 2
189 H.R. 4173, §7103(g)(1). This provision, amending the '40 Advisers Act, is
dense and contains many critical changes affecting both investment advisers and
broker dealers. Hopefully in the final version of the Investor Protection Act
Congress will more clearly delineate these changes in separate or more clearly
defined provisions.
190 Senate Banking Committee member Tim Johnson (R-S.D.) is considering an
amendment to H.R. 4173 that requires the SEC "to develop a rule for treating all
providers of investment advice as fiduciaries." SEC Would Be Required to
Develop One Fiduciary Rule Under New Plan, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), No.
8, at 290 (Feb. 22, 2010). SIFMA disagrees with such a uniform fiduciary standard
on all financial advisors, cautioning that "brokers operate under very different
business models than advisors." Id. at 291.
'9' H.R. 4173, § 7103(b)(1)(o)(2).
192 Id. § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1) (emphasis added).
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But the 1940 Advisers Act is amended on this issue as follows:
The receipt of compensation based on commission or fees
shall not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of such
standard applied to a broker, dealer, or investment
adviser."19 3
This statutory construction appears to place certain presumptions
against broker-dealers based on the type of compensation they receive. To
illustrate, H.R. 4173 says that a broker-dealer's receipt of a "commission or
other standard compensation" does not in itself violate the fiduciary duty
standard. It does not say, as it does for advisers, that a broker-dealer's
receipt of a "fee" will not in itself violate the fiduciary duty standard. So, is
Congress saying that a broker dealer offering investment advice to a retail
customer in a fee-based brokerage account is presumed to be violating the
fiduciary duty standard? If so, this not only legislates the 2007 decision of
the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected the SEC's attempt to
exempt broker-dealer fee-based accounts from the fiduciary duty imposed
under the Adviser's Act, but goes even further to impose a presumption that
broker-dealers operating under a fee based account are violating the
fiduciary duty standard.' 94 Yet these provisions were kept in the final bill
reconciling the House and Senate versions.
Another interesting difference between the amendments affecting
broker-dealers and investment advisers is the fact that H.R. 4173 amends
the 1940 Advisers Act to include a provision that allows customers to
"consent[] to" and waive "any material conflicts of interest."'9 5 But the
amendment to the 1934 Exchange Act, which is otherwise similar in
substance and structure, does not contain an express right for broker-dealers
to obtain similar waivers.196 However, it is unclear whether broker-dealers
may still be able to waive material conflicts of interest given that the
"Harmonization of Enforcement" provisions of HR 4173 apply the same
standards of conduct and disclosure on broker-dealers and investment
advisers.' 97
But the SEC cannot propose any rules under the Harmonization of
Enforcement provisions of HR 4173 until it publishes a study examining,
among other things, the "nature of a 'retail customer;' the products and
' Id. § 7103(a)(1)(g)(1) (emphasis added).
194 Compare discussion supra Part II.E.
'" H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(g)(1).
196 See id. § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1).
'9 See id. §§ 7103(b)(1)(o)(2), 7103(b)(2)(i)(2) (noting that the SEC can
"prosecute and sanction" broker dealers and investment advisers "to the same
extent" under both the '34 Exchange Act and the '40 Advisers Act).
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services sold to retail customers; the fees charged for those products and
services; and any conflicts of interest that may arise.'98 This delay in the
enactment of the Harmonization of Enforcement rules by the SEC does not
affect the SEC's ability to immediately impose the fiduciary duty standards
and disclosure requirements on broker-dealers and investments advisers
under §7103 of H.R. 4173.'99
H.R. 4173 does contain one wavier provision that will immediately
apply only to broker-dealers - they will have to "obtain the consent or
acknowledgement" on every sale to every customer if they sell "only
proprietary or other limited range of products, as determined by the
Commission." 2 0o Thus, it appears any broker-dealer with registered
representatives holding a Series Six20 1 or similar limited license, or that are
under agreement to only sell products from a single sponsor, issuer, or
underwriter, will have greater disclosure burdens than other broker-dealers.
Moreover, the provision does not specifically legislate details on the
application of this provision, instead giving the SEC total discretion to
determine what it means for broker-dealers to offer only "proprietary or
other limited range of products," thus subjecting these broker-dealers to
more onerous and less predictable disclosure obligations.
b. The Senate Bill
i. The Senate Struggles to Find Bipartisan
Compromise
After the House bill passed in December 2009, SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar chided the Senate in February 2010 for stalling reform,
expressing "doubt that ongoing reform efforts in the Senate 'will lead to
actual legislation."' 2 02  One week later, Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) said he was "optimistic" about developing
1 See id. § 7104(a)(l)-(5); see also id. § 7102 (clarifying the SEC's authority to
engage in "consumer testing," and empowering the SEC to "gather information"
and "communicate with investors or other members of the public" in furtherance of
this testing). Section 7102 raises confidentiality and constitutional issues to the
extent that statements and documents obtained by the SEC in a "consumer test" are
used in customer arbitrations, SEC enforcement actions, or DOJ criminal
prosecutions against a broker dealer.
' See id. § 7104(b)(2).200 Id. § 7103(a)(1)(m)(2).
21 This is a limited securities license that only permits a broker dealer registered
representative to sell mutual funds, variable annuities, and insurance premiums.
Series Six licensees are not permitted to sell corporate or municipal securities,
direct participation programs, or options.
202 Aguilar Cites Doubts Regarding Progress of Regulatory Reform Effort, Sec.
Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 261-62 (Feb. 15, 2010).
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a "consensus bill" after he and Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) resumed
negotiations that had stalled with ranking Republican member Richard
Shelby (R-Ala.). 203 A month after Senator Dodd's expressed optimism
about passage of the more business-friendly compromise bill, the potential
serial amendments to the compromise Senate bill by Senator Dodd's
Democratic colleagues threatened to derail it.204 As a result, Senator Dodd
cautioned that the compromise bill is "delicate and .. . could trip easily."205
It did trip, and on March 15, 2010, Senator Dodd introduced a
partisan overhaul bill without Republican support, styled the Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (Financial Stability Act).2 06 "The
Senate Banking Committee voted along party lines March 22 to move the
bill to the Senate floor" for a vote.207 Senator Dodd and his Democratic
colleagues hoped to leverage the public's frustration with Wall Street
against congressional opponents of the bill.208
At the same time Congress was trying to pass this historic financial
overhaul bill, it had just passed an arguably more historic health care
reform bill. The partisan rancor over the health care reform bill poisoned
Republican cooperation with the financial overhaul bill. 209  Therefore,
Senator Dodd and the Democrat majority in the Senate unilaterally
introduced Dodd's bill, hoping to rally public support.210 On Friday, March
203 Dodd to Negotiate With Corker in Effort to Clear Financial Services Reform
Bill, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 265-66 (Feb. 15, 2010).
204 See Damian Paletta, Amendments to Bipartisan Financial-Regulation Overhaul
Bill Could Threaten Republican Cooperation and Scuttle Proposal, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11, 2010, at A4 (noting that the Obama "White House took the unusual step
of weighing in on the pending bill" and objecting to some more lenient provisions).
205 Id.
206 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (as
proposed in Senate, Mar. 15, 2010); see also Damian Paletta, Corker Opposes
Current Financial Overhaul, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 31, 2010, at A4 (quoting Senator
Corker (R. Tenn.) as saying "I couldn't support the bill in its current form," noting
that Democrats need the yes vote of at least one Republican senator to pass the bill,
and that "[n]o Republican has yet signaled support for the bill . . .
207 See Paletta, supra note 204.
208 See Sewell Chan, With Nods to Both Sides, Dodd Will Introduce Reform Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at Bl, B10; see also S. 3217.
209 See Chan, supra note 208 ("Republicans have also said that the poisonous
atmosphere over health care had seeped into the debate over financial regulatory
reform.").
210 See Damian Paletta, Dodd's Proposed Wall Street Rules Would Toughen
Scrutiny ofBanks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2010, at A2. Republicans asked all 41
Republican Senators to sign a letter committing to filibuster Senator Dodd's
proposed bill. In response, the Obama Administration has been courting individual
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19, 2010, lawmakers filed "roughly" 400 amendments to the bill.21' On
Monday, March 22, 2010, Senate Republicans withdrew the 200
amendments they had filed on Friday, realizing that the amendments would
likely have been defeated, and could have "played into a burgeoning White
House strategy of portraying Republicans as obstructionists" opposed to
reforming financial rules.212
The Obama Administration ratcheted-up anti-Wall Street sentiment
on April 16, 2010, when the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with securities
fraud over its role in creating and selling "synthetic collateralized debt
obligations," which were built out of risky sub-prime mortgage assets.2 13
Both Democrats and Republicans sought to use the SEC charges against
Goldman to support their respective positions on the contentious financial
reform bill.2 14 The SEC's complaint against Goldman "appears to have
supercharged Mr. Obama's legislative push, just as the implosion of
WorldCom all but ensured the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
governance law in 2002.",215 Days later, President Obama gave a speech in
Manhattan's Cooper Union to top financial executives, urging them to "call
off 'the furious effort of industry lobbyists to shape this legislation to their
special interests."'
2 16
Republican Senators in hopes of finding the support of one Republican Senator that
it needs to overcome a Republican filibuster of the bill. Damian Paletta & Victoria
McGrane, GOP Fights to Unify Opposition to Bill; White House Hopes Public
Anger at Wall Street Compels Some Republicans to Join Financial Overhaul,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2010, at A6.
211 Michael R. Cirtenden & Damian Paletta, Big Push to Overhaul Finance Rules,
as Lawmakers Dig In, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2010 at A2.
212 See Damian Paletta, Financial Overhaul Advances, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2010
at A2.
213 See Gregory Zuckerman, Susanne Craig, & Srenena Ng, Goldman Sachs
Charged With Fraud: SEC Alleges Firm Misled Investors on Securities Linked to
Subprime Mortgages; Major Escalation in Showdown With Wall Street, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 17, 2010, at Al; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Goldman Sachs & Co.
and Fabrice Tourre, 10 CV 3229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Complaint).
214 See Damian Paletta & Victoria McGrane, Fraud Allegations Further Inflame
Fight Over Financial Regulation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at A5. In response
to the Goldman case, Congress seeks to impose a fiduciary duty on investment
banks like Goldman when they create and market securities to their customers,
regardless of their customers' size and sophistication. See John D. McKinnon,
Lawmakers Target Investment Banks, WALL. ST. J., May 5, 2010, at Cl.
215 Jonathan Weisman & Damian Paletta, Climax Looms for Finance Bill, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 23, 2010 at Al, A4. Interestingly, "President Barack Obama won't
return about $1 million that employees of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. donated to
his 2008 presidential campaign. . . ." Brody Mullins & Jean Spencer, Obama to
Keep Goldman Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2010, at A5.
216 Weisman, supra note 215.
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ii. The Senate Bill Strikes the Right Cord with
Fiduciary Duty Study
Whatever dissention exists within Congress and the financial industry
regarding the larger Financial Stability Act bill, neither Congress nor the
financial industry should have a difficult time accepting the provisions relating
to standard of care for brokers and advisers. Indeed, commentators opine that
the Senate bill's proposal for the standard of care governing broker-dealers
and investment advisers "is likely to survive the floor debate and the
reconciliation with the House bill."2 17 The final bill passed by the Senate on
May 20, 2010 includes the study, as does the reconciled bill of June 26, 2010.
The Senate bill takes a much-needed deep breath from H.R. 4173 and the
Obama draft legislation by recommending against immediate enactment of a
uniform fiduciary duty for both broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Instead, the Financial Stability Act recommends that the SEC conduct a
detailed study of all the potential benefits, problems, and conflicts that may
arise with such a uniform standard. 218
Within one year after enactment of the Financial Stability Act, the
SEC must deliver its report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House.219 The reconciled bill requires the SEC report in six months.
The SEC report must identify, among other things, whether there exists any
"legal or regulatory gaps or overlap . .. relating to the standards of care" for
broker-dealers and advisers, and to what extent those gaps can be addressed
217 Hill Watch, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), Apr. 5, 2010, at 645.
218 See S. 3217, § 913. Title IX of the Financial Stability Act is dubbed "Investor
Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities." Subtitle A of Title
IX is called "Increasing Investor Protection." It addresses the standard governing
financial advisors, sets forth required disclosures to customers, creates an "Investor
Advocate" within the SEC, requires a study on the "financial literacy among
investors," requires a study of conflicts of interest between bankers and securities
analysts in the same firm, a study on access to broker-dealer and investment adviser
information, and a study of financial planners. See id. §§ 911- 919B. Subtitle B of
Title IX is called "Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies;" it gives the
SEC authority to restrict or eliminate mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
provides whistleblower rights, remedies, and protections, among other things. See
id. §§ 921-929C.
219 See S. 3217, § 913(d)(1). But see Malini Manickavasagam, Aguilar Urges
Congress to Extend Fiduciary Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep.
(BNA), No. 13, at 571-72 (Mar. 29, 2010) (noting opinion of SEC Commissioner
Aguilar that the mandated study is "unnecessary" because the existing fiduciary
standard as developed under the Advisers Act is "a strong workable standard that
has done its job for decades.").
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by either SEC rule or with additional Congressional authority.220 If the
SEC's report identifies gaps in the standard of care governing broker-
dealers and advisors, it has two years from the date the Financial Stability
Act is enacted to "commence a rulemaking" to address the gap.22 1
While the Financial Stability Act bill is named and somewhat
patterned after the draft legislation published by Senator Dodd back in
November 2009, the provisions addressing the standard of care for broker-
dealers are markedly different.2 22 Section 913 in Dodd's November 2009
draft is short, and simply amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 by
including brokers and dealers within the definition of "investment advisor"
under the Advisers Act. The Dodd draft accomplishes this by eliminating
the provision in the Advisers Act that excludes from the definition of
investment adviser "any broker or dealer whose performance of such
services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or
dealer and who receives no special compensation therefore."2 23
The Dodd draft proposed to immediately treat broker-dealers
exactly like investment advisors; this would have been disastrous for the
entire financial services industry for all the reasons laid out in this Article.
Such a rule would also be a disaster for the SEC because it would drown
the SEC by adding to its responsibilities the registration and regulation of
4,900 brokerage firms, 174,000 brokerage branch offices, and over 650,000
registered representatives.22 4  Currently, the SEC registers and regulates
11,300 investment advisers.22 5
The Senate bill, like H.R. 4173, defines the constituency it is meant
to protect as "retail customers." 226 The Senate bill defines the "retail
customer" as "an individual customer of a broker, dealer, investment
adviser, person associated with a broker or dealer, or a person associated
220 See S. 3217, § 913(d)(2).
221 See S. 3217, § 913(f)(1)(A).
222 Compare Restoring Financial Stability Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (draft
legislation introduced by Sen. Dodd on Nov. 10, 2009).
223 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)(C) (2006), with S. 1074, § 913(a)(1) (draft
legislation introduced by Sen. Dodd on Nov. 10, 2009) (striking section 80b-
2(a)(11)(B) from the current Investment Advisers Act). Some commentators and
SEC Commissioners support the Dodd draft. See, e.g., Malini Manickavasagam,
Aguilar Urges Congress to Extend Fiduciary Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Sec.
Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at 571-72 (Mar. 29, 2010) (noting opinion of
SEC Commissioner Aguilar that the existing fiduciary standard as developed under
the Advisers Act is "a strong workable standard that has done its job for decades.");
Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation ofBroker-Dealers and Investment
Advisors, 65 Bus. LAWYER, 412 (2010).
224 See Laby, supra note 223, at 398.
225 See id.
226 S. 3217, § 913(a)(2).
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with an investment adviser."2 27 The Senate's definition of retail customer
differs from the definition in H.R. 4173, and in the Obama draft legislation,
as follows:
CHANGING DEFINITION OF "RETAIL CUSTOMER"
Obama Draft H.R. 4173 S. 3217
"retail customers or "a natural peron... "an individual
clients (and such other who receives customer of a broker,
customers or clients as personalized investment dealer, investment
the Commission may advice about securities adviser, person
by rule provide.)" 22 8  from a broker or dealer; associated with a
and uses such advice broker or dealer, or a
primarily for personal, person associated with
family, or household an investment
purposes. 2  adviser. 3
The Senate's definition of a retail customer as "an individual
customer," rather than the House's definition of a "natural person" who
receives "personalized investment advice" for use "primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes," avoids some of the many practical and
policy problems with the House's definition, discussed supra Part III.A.3.a.
However, the reconciled bill goes back to the House's proposed definition.
The Senate definition also expressly includes customers of "associated
persons" of broker-dealers, such as the individual registered representatives
that sell broker-dealer products and services. The Senate's open-ended
definition provides opportunities for varying interpretations by the courts
and the SEC. However, any problems with the definition may be
ameliorated by the results of the focused study mandated by the Senate.
iii. The Senate s Focused Mandate to Study
the Effects of a Uniform Fiduciary Duty
Highlights the Challenges ofImplementing
This Standard
The Senate bill provides a clear and specific mandate that the SEC
conduct a study on standards of conduct in the retail financial industry. The
mandate starts with a focused definition of the study topic, and then drills
227 Id.
228 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 913(a)(k).
229 H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(3).
230 S. 3217, § 913 (a)(2)
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down with twelve specific "considerations" the SEC study must address.
Thus, the SEC study that results from this bill will be more complete,
practical, and user-friendly than the data collected by the SEC-
commissioned study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, released in
2008 and titled "Investor and Industry Perspectives on Investment Advisers
and Broker-Dealers." 2 3 1 But the data collected and analyzed by RAND,
cited throughout this Article,23 2 will be a tremendous head start for the SEC.
The topic that Congress requires the SEC to study is the
effectiveness of the various standards of care currently governing broker-
dealers and investment advisers:
The Commission shall conduct a study to evaluate ----
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory
standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment
advisers, persons associated with broker dealers, and
persons associated with investment advisers for
providing personalized investment advice and
recommendations about securities to retail customers
imposed by the Commission and FINRA, and other
Federal and State legal or regulatory standards; and
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps or overlap in
legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail
customers relating to the standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with
brokers or dealers, and persons associated with
investment advisers for providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers
that should be addressed by rule or statute.233
The Senate mandate is refreshingly independent and objective, and does not
presume that a fiduciary standard is the standard that will or should be
adopted, or that a uniform standard should apply to all retail financial firms
and professionals. To the contrary, as revealed by the twelve
"considerations" that SEC is to study, it leaves open the possibility that
investment advisers could be subject to FINRA's suitability standard, which
currently governs broker-dealers.
It will be the results of the study of the twelve considerations that
will shape the future standards governing broker-dealers and investment
advisers. These considerations touch upon many of the problems and
inconsistencies identified in this Article as incumbent with an unwavering
uniform fiduciary duty on all retail financial firms and professionals.
231 RAND Study, supra note 88.
232 E.g. supra notes 88, 104, 108-13, 144-48, 167, and infra note 276.
233 S. 3217, § 913(b)(1)-(2).
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The twelve considerations the SEC must study under the Senate
mandate include:
(1) the "regulatory, examination, and enforcement resources" that
FINRA and the SEC expend to enforce the standards of care for
broker-dealers and advisers "when providing personalized
investment advice and recommendations about securities to
retail customers," including the frequency and length of time of
examinations of broker-dealers and advisers;23 4
(2) the "substantive differences" in the regulation of broker dealers
and advisers, "when providing personalized investment advice
and recommendations about securities to retail customers,
including the differences in the amount of resources devoted to
the regulation and examination of brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, by the Commission and FINRA;" 235
(3) "the specific instances in which the regulation and oversight of
investment advisers provide greater protection to retail
customers than the regulation and oversight of brokers and
dealers," and when the regulations governing broker-dealers
provides greater protection to retail customers than those
236
governing investment advisers;
(4) "the existing legal or regulatory standards of State securities
regulators and other regulators intended to protect retail
customers;" 237
(5) the potential impact on the products and services available to
retail customers of broker-dealers if broker-dealers were
subject to the fiduciary duty standard of care imposed by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as well as the "other
requirements" of the Advisers Act; 238
(6) the potential impact on investment advisers if they were subject
to the standards of care imposed on broker-dealers by the SEC
and FINRA, which includes the suitability standard of care, and
also the impact of allowing the SEC to designate FINRA or
234See id. § 913(c)(1).
2351d. § 913(c)(2).
236See id. § 913(c)(3).
2371d. § 913(c)(4).
23 8See id. § 913(c)(5).
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another self-regulatory organization to oversee investment
advisers; 239
(7) the potential impact of implementing §913 of Senator Dodd's
November 2009 draft legislation; namely "eliminating the
broker and dealer exclusion from the definition of 'investment
adviser' under section 202(a)( 11)(C) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, in terms of-
(A) the potential benefits or harm to retail customers
that could result from such a change, including any
potential impact on access to personalized
investment advice and recommendations about
securities to retail customers or the availability of
such advice and recommendations;
(B) the number of additional entities and individuals
that would be required to register under, or become
subject to, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
and the additional requirements to which brokers-
dealers. . .would become subject including -
(i) any potential additional associated person
licensing, registration, and examination
requirements; and
(ii) the additional costs, if any, to the
additional entities and individuals; and
(C) the impact on Commission resources to -
(i) conduct examinations of registered
investment advisers and the representatives
of registered investment advisers,
including the impact on the examination
cycle; and
(ii) enforce the standard of care and other
applicable requirements imposed under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.",240
(8) "the ability of investors to understand the differences in
terms of regulatory oversight and examinations between
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers;" 241
(9) "the varying level of services provided by brokers, dealers,
[and] investment advisers, . . .and the varying scope and
239 See id. § 913(c)(6).
240 Id. § 913(c)(7).
241 Id. § 913(c)(8).
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terms of retail customer relationships of brokers, dealers,
[and] investment advisers, with such retail
customers;" 242
(10) "any potential benefits or harm to retail customers that
could result from any potential changes in the regulatory
requirements or legal standards affecting brokers, dealers,
[and] investment advisers ... relating to their obligations
to retail customers including any potential impact on -
(A) protection from fraud;
(B) access to personalized investment advice, and
recommendations about securities to retail
customers; or
(C) the availability of such advice and
recommendations;, 243
(11) "the additional costs and expenses to retail customers and
to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers resulting from
potential changes in the regulatory requirements or legal
standards affecting brokers, dealers, [and] investment
advisers . . . relating to their obligations to retail
customers;" 244 and
(12) "any other consideration that the Commission deems
necessary and appropriate to effectively execute the study
required under subsection (b)." 2 45
The reconciled House and Senate bill provides that after the study the SEC
"may" provide for a uniform fiduciary standard for broker dealers and
investment advisers, unlike HR 4173 which required the SEC to do so. The
reconciled bill also adds back some of the controversial "Harmonization of
Enforcement" provisions of HR 4173, which creates some disparity in the
24 2 Id. § 913(c)(9).
243 Id. § 913(c)(10).
244 Id. § 913(c)(11).
245 Id. § 913(c)(12). The reconciled bill contains essentially the same
considerations. Section 919 requires the Comptroller General of the United States
to conduct a study regarding the conflicts of interest between bankers and securities
analysts in the same firm. Section 919A requires the SEC to conduct a study of
ways to improve investor access to information for broker-dealers in the Central
Registration Depository, and investment advisers in the Investment Adviser
Registration Depository. Finally, § 919B requires the Comptroller General to study
the effectiveness of regulations protecting consumers from financial planners.
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treatment of broker-dealers and advisers, analyzed more fully in Part
III.A.3.a.
4. So What Will the Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers
Look Like? Likely the Same as It Has For Investment
Advisers
Because broker-dealers have traditionally not been held to a
fiduciary standard, and because most of the claims by consumers alleging a
violation of a fiduciary duty owed by broker-dealers managing
discretionary or de facto discretionary accounts have been arbitrated and
thus not published, there is limited and dated precedent as to what this
fiduciary duty for broker-dealers will look like in modem practice. 24 Some
within the SEC suggest creating a brand new fiduciary standard by
throwing out both the 1934 Act and Investment Advisers Act and creating a
single piece of legislation that encompasses the best parts of both.247
But statements made by various other SEC Commissioners and
commentators suggest adopting the proposal in Senator Dodd's November
2009 draft legislation - that regulators simply include broker-dealers
within the Investor Advisers Act by repealing the current provision of that
Act that expressly excludes broker-dealers from it. For example, on May 7,
2009, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar commented that "with the advent of
fee-based brokerage accounts in the 1990's, broker-dealers have been
increasingly selling programs that regularly provide 'investment advice' in
exchange for 'special compensation' in the form of an asset-based fee."
Thus, Mr. Aguilar concluded that broker-dealers should no longer be
excluded from the Investment Advisers Act and its concomitant fiduciary
duties: "There is only one fiduciary standard and it means that a fiduciary
has an affirmative obligation to put a client's interests above his or her
246 For example, the seminal fiduciary duty case for broker-dealers was issued in
1978. See Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 953. The court opined on general fiduciary
standards for broker-dealers handling a discretionary or de facto discretionary
account: 1) actively manage the account in accord with the customers interests and
objectives; 2) keep himself informed of all changes in the market that affect the
customer's investment interests; 3) keep the customer informed as to every
transaction the broker completes; and 4) "explain forthrightly the practical impact
and potential risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged." Id.
247 See Elisse B. Walter, Sec. & Exch. Comm'r, Mutual Fund Directors Forum
Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO50509ebw.htm ("Congress should
throw both statutes on the floor, select what is best in each, and cover any holes
through which the floor boards show.").
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own." 248 On May 5, 2009, SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter commented
that a "uniform standard of conduct" be created "and that standard should
require all financial professionals to act as fiduciaries at all times."249
On March 26, 2010, SEC Commissioner Aguilar reaffirmed his
position that broker-dealers be treated as fiduciaries under the Advisers Act
when he expressed disagreement with the Senate bill's mandate to study the
fiduciary standard of care.2 50 Mr. Aguilar remarked that "further study is
unnecessary" because the fiduciary standard as developed under the
Advisers Act is "'a strong workable standard that has done its job for
decades."' 251 "Aguilar described the [fiduciary] duty as a [sic] affirmative
obligation to act in the best interests of clients 'with undivided loyalty."' 252
This is consistent with the language used in the Obama Whitepaper
that the broker-dealer standard of care be raised to the fiduciary duty
standard "to align the legal framework with investment advisers."2 53 As
discussed supra, previous drafts of legislation from the Obama
Administration, the House, and Senator Dodd essentially go the way
Commissioner Aguilar suggests and simply adopt the same "standard of
conduct applicable to an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.254 And the current Senate bill contemplates that such a
uniform rule is possible. If this becomes the rule, broker-dealers already
have a useful and realistic road map of what their new fiduciary duties may
look like. So it makes sense to look at how fiduciary duties and standards
have developed under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment
Company Act, SEC regulations implementing fiduciary duties under those
Acts, and case law interpreting those regulations and standards.
248 Blaine F. Aikin, SEC's Aguilar Urges Fiduciary Standard, INVESTMENT NEWS
(June 7, 2009),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090607/REG/3060799 96.
249 See Walter, supra note 247, at 5.
250 See Malini Manickavasagam, Aguilar Urges Congress to Extend Fiduciary
Duty, Clarify OCIE's Power, Secs. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at 571-72
(Mar. 29, 2010).
251 Id. at 572.
252 Id. at 571.
253 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 71.
254 H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(m)(1).
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a. Fiduciary Duty as Defined in SEC Regulations
Investment advisers have fiduciary duties in two contexts: 1) in the
investment advice they provide;255 and 2) in the fees they charge for that
advice.256 As discussed infra, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that
the fiduciary duty applicable when an adviser sets its fees differs from the
fiduciary duty imposed when it provides advice.257
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act is the source of the
adviser's fiduciary duty when providing investment advice. 25 8 But section
206 says nothing about fiduciary duties. Instead, it makes it unlawful for
investment advisers to defraud clients, or engage in any self-serving
transactions without first obtaining the client's consent.2 59 It was not until
the Supreme Court interpreted the Advisers Act in S.E.C. v. Capital
Gains260 in 1963 that the current concept of fiduciary duty was imposed on
investment advisers when providing investment advice.26 Because the
exact nature of an investment adviser's fiduciary duty was never expressly
defined by Congress, the SEC has "expansive leeway" to create or redefine
what obligations are imposed.262 While an adviser's general duties involve
promoting the client's financial goals, the fiduciary obligations regulated
263
most by the SEC are those negative duties aimed at protecting investors.
A review of various SEC regulations affecting investment advisers
reveals that broker-dealers may be subject to some new and enhanced
disclosure and compliance duties currently imposed on advisers. One
255 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
256 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b); Jones et al. v. Harris Assoc. LP, 559 U.S. _ (Mar.
30, 2010).
217 See Jones, 559 U.S. _ (2010); see also Brent Kendall & Daisy Maxey, High
Court Gives Leeway for Lawsuits On Fund Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar 31, 2010, at Cl.
258 See 15 U.S.C § 80b-6.
259 See id.
260 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 192.
261 See id. at 191-92, 194-95. (construing the legislative history and intent of the
'40 Advisers Act as intending that customers would repose in their investment
advisers their trust and confidence that the adviser would execute transactions only
in their best interest, and that the relationship was not at arm's-length). See infra
Part III.A.4.c.i.
262 See Lemke & Stone, supra note 165, at 5 (explaining the SEC expands and
updates investment advisers' fiduciary obligations frequently through informal
methods such as settled enforcement actions or no-action letters as opposed to
formal rulemaking).
263 See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 192 (explaining that the reason for finding a
fiduciary duty requirement in the Investment Adviser's Act was congressional
intent to protect consumers from investment advisers who "render advice which
was not disinterested").
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example is the requirement that each investment adviser adopt a written
"code of ethics,"26" that, at a minimum, must include:
* Standards of business conduct that "must reflect your fiduciary
obligations and those of your supervised persons;" 26 5
* Requirements that the adviser and all supervised persons comply
with applicable federal securities laws;2 66
* That any person who has access to a customer's non-public
information, or trades in an adviser customer's account based on
the customer's non-public information (e.g., broker-dealers), report
their securities transactions to the adviser;267
* That all supervised persons report any violation of the adviser's
code of ethics to the adviser's chief compliance officer;268 and
* Requirements that the adviser provide his code of ethics along with
any amendments to each supervised person, and a certification from
each supervised person that they received the adviser's code of
ethics.2
Similarly, the SEC also requires advisers to "adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent a violation"
by the adviser (or a supervised person) of the Adviser's Act or any SEC
rule adopted under the Act.270 At the same time it issued its regulation
requiring written policies and procedures by advisers, the SEC issued a rule
setting forth the minimum standards for the contents of an adviser's written
policies and procedures. These minimal standards include portfolio
management processes, general and proprietary trading practices and
activities, accuracy of disclosures, safeguarding client assets, creating and
maintaining adequate records, marketing of advisory services, client asset
264 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a) (2009).
265 Id. § 275.204A-l(a)(1).
266 Id. § 275.204A-1(a)(2).
267 Id. § 275.204A-1(a)(3). The regulation sets forth very demanding and specific
details of the transactions and securities effected by the access person, which can
include the adviser himself or any broker-dealer or other intermediary the adviser
uses who trades on the adviser customer's non-public information. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(b) (2009).
268 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a)(4) (2009).
26 9 Id. § 275.204A-1(a)(5)
27 0 Id. § 275.206(4)-7(a).
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valuation processes and fees, privacy ?rotection of client holdings and
records, and "business continuity plans." n
The SEC also requires an adviser to review at least annually its
written policies and procedures to ensure their "adequacy," the
"effectiveness of their implementation,"272 and appoint a chief compliance
officer to administer the adviser's policies and procedures.273
Investment advisers currently have more onerous disclosure
requirements to their customers than broker-dealers do to theirs. For
example, an adviser must disclose to customers and prospective customers
any "legal or disciplinary event that is material to an evaluation of the
adviser's integrity or ability to meet contractual commitments to clients."274
The SEC creates through regulation a "rebuttable presumption" that an
adviser must disclose as a material fact a finding of liability or guilt in any
civil or criminal action involving any "investment-related business; fraud,
false statements, or omissions; wrongful taking of property; or bribery,
forgery, counterfeiting, or extortion. 27 5 In addition, investment advisers
must file the voluminous Form ADV, which must be disclosed to both
prospective and current customers.2 76
The requirements that advisers (and potentially broker-dealers)
create and disclose personal ethics and trading policies and procedures
subjects them to additional fiduciary duties of their own making, separate
and apart from whatever duties Congress or the SEC create for them. For
example, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act creates a duty on a trustee
investing funds of the trust to employ any special skills or expertise the
trustee advertises. 2 77 Thus, a failure by the trustee to fulfill the special duty
271 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2204, 81 SEC Docket 2775 (Dec. 17, 2003).
272 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(b) (2009).
273 Id. § 275.206(4)-7(c).
2 74 Id. § 275.206(4)-4(a)(2).
275 Id. § 275.206(4)-4(b)(1)(i) (effective July 8, 1997). This regulation also
contains disclosure requirements for any administrative action against the adviser
brought by the SEC or FINRA. The Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer
Registration, and the Form U-4 for registered representatives of broker-dealers,
requires disclosure to the SEC and FINRA of similar criminal, civil, and regulatory
convictions and findings of liability, but not customers. Investment advisers,
however, are required by regulation to disclose this information to their customers.
276 See RAND Study, supra note 88, at 12; see also Form ADV,
www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
277 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(f) (1994) ("A trustee who has special
skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's representation
that the trustee has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those special skills
or expertise.").
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he flouted is a violation of his fiduciary duty to his customers. 2 78 Similarly,
an adviser's failure to comply with his publicly-disclosed personal ethics
and trading policies may violate his fiduciary duty.
b. Fiduciary Duty as Implemented in SEC
Examinations
In a February 27, 2006 speech, the SEC's Director of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations, Lori Richards, sought to set forth a
comprehensive yet practical definition of the fiduciary duties applicable to
investment advisers by using concrete examples of how those duties were
applied and sanctioned in SEC adviser examinations. 279
Ms. Richards postured that fiduciary duty "is not difficult to define
or to understand," explaining that "fiduciary comes from the Latin word for
'trust.' A fiduciary must act for the benefit of the person to whom he owes
fiduciary duties, to the exclusion of any contrary interest." 28 0 MS. Richards
recognized that the area where complying with an adviser's fiduciary duty
is most challenging is where the interest of the adviser or the firm conflict
with that of the customer.28' Ms. Richards said this was the "most
282frequently-found deficiency" in SEC examinations of advisers.
Ms. Richards noted that the first duty of the adviser is to recognize
the conflict, the second is to "disclose material conflicts of interest in a 'full
and fair' manner and to ensure your clients understand any material
conflicts of interest before taking action. Because you are a fiduciary, you
should not allow your client to enter the advisory relationship without a
278 See id.
279 See Lori Richards, Dir. of Compliance Investigations & Examinations, SEC,
Fiduciary Duty: Return to First Principles, Speech at the Eighth Annual Investment
Adviser Compliance Summit (Feb 27, 2006). Ms. Richards frequently addresses
compliance issues facing investment advisers in various speeches, which is a
tremendous resource for investment advisers and their counsel. See, e.g., Lori
Richards, Strengthening Examination Oversight: Changes to Regulatory
Examinations, Speech at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Division (June 17, 2009);
Lori Richards, Compliance in Today's Environment: Step Up to the Challenge,
Speech at Investment Adviser Compliance Best Practices Summit (Mar. 12, 2009);
Lori Richards, Focus Areas in SEC Examination of Investment Advisers: The Top
10, Speech at Investment Adviser Compliance Best Practices Summit (Mar. 20,
2008).
280 Richards, supra note 279.
281 See id.
282 See id.
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clear understanding of all material conflicts." 283 This indicates that the SEC
may permit sales of broker-dealer securities products that pose a conflict of
interest as long as the broker-dealer complies with the disclosure
requirements applicable to advisers. But it remains to be seen what
Congress and the SEC do with this issue in the current political and
enforcement environment. As discussed supra, the current drafts of the
investor protection legislation do not clearly define whether broker-dealer
customers can waive certain material conflicts of interest. 284
Half of the disclosure problems discovered in SEC adviser
examinations "relate to inaccurate, incomplete, and even misleading
information in Forms ADV."285 And half of these include 'problematic
disclosure of business practices and fees charged to clients." 28  Examples
of inadequate disclosures, and thus violations of the adviser's fiduciary
duty, found in SEC examinations include the following:
* Clients were not informed of the real method used
to calculate the adviser's fee. Fees appeared to be
lower than they were in fact.
* An adviser failed to disclose that he recommends
securities to clients in which he has a proprietary
interest.
* An adviser failed to disclose the risks to clients that
existed by having their assets invested in private
investments.
* An adviser failed to disclose that clients with
directed brokerage arrangements may not achieve
best execution.
* An adviser does not accurately describe the types
of products and services it obtains with clients' soft
dollars.
* Clients whose assets were invested in mutual funds
were not told that they pay both a direct
management fee to their adviser and an indirect
management fee to the adviser of their mutual
funds.
283 id
284 See supra Part III.A.3.
285 Richards, supra note 279. The SEC is currently accepting comments on a
proposal to revise its Form ADV to add more "meaningful" disclosures of an
investment adviser's business practices and conflicts of interest. See SEC Release
No. IA-2711, 34-57419; Amendments to Form ADV, 2008 SEC LEXIS 466 (Mar.
3, 2008).
286 Richards, supra note 279.
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* An adviser stated that it did not have custody of
client assets when in fact it did.
* An adviser did not disclose that it receives
economic benefit from a non-client in connection
with giving advice to clients.
* An adviser did not disclose that even if clients
direct that their securities transactions be executed
through a certain broker-dealer, the adviser did not
actually execute most transactions through that
firm.
* An adviser had not amended its ADV for several
years although the rules require that it be amended
at least annually and more frequently if required,
information was therefore out-of-date.
* An adviser incorrectly stated that it did not have
discretion to direct trades to specific broker-
dealers, when in fact it did.
* Clients were provided with incorrect information
about the adviser's review of their accounts, and
the frequency of those reviews.287
A review of SEC examination procedures reveals how critical it is
for advisers (and potentially broker-dealers) to accurately disclose to
customers, and conduct business in conformity with, information that is
contained in their Form ADV and their written policies and procedures.
Every SEC examination begins with a thorough review of the
information the adviser disseminates to its customers and the public in parts I
and II of its ADV.28 g Then the examiners compare the adviser's actual
business practices, services, and disclosures, to how those practices, services,
and disclosures are described in the adviser's written policies and procedures
and its Form ADV. "When discrepancies or omissions between the firm's
written disclosures and its actual practice are identified, this will trigger
heightened scrutiny by the exam staff. As a fiduciary, it is fundamental that
what you tell your clients is, in fact, how you conduct your business." 2 8 9
So how does an adviser guard against such violations? Do what the
SEC examiners do - compare all the representations and disclosures in your
written materials with the firm's actual business practices. The SEC
recommends having firm employees knowledgeable in all aspects of the
287 Id. at 4.
288 See id. at 5.289 d
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adviser's business operations review the disclosures, "from compliance to
portfolio management to trading desk to business operations." 2 90 "This is
important, because disclosures must reflect actual practice, and who better to
know the nature of the firm's actual practices than those who are actually
doing it. This practice also helps keep disclosures 'real,' and not simply
aspirational or marketing literature." 29' Finally, it is important that the firm
promptly rectify any problems identified in this review. Some firms perform
the same type of comparative review to client portfolios "to ensure that
portfolio transactions are consistent with disclosures to and instructions from
the client." 292
It is important for compliance officers to understand that the SEC
examiners will ask about material weaknesses the firm has identified in its
compliance procedures, and likely require a written response from the senior
compliance officer before the exit interview. This enables the SEC to apply
greater scrutiny to weaker compliance controls of the firm. It is also
important to understand that the SEC's decision on whether to take
enforcement action based on the examination will be determined by SEC
lawyers and analysts back in the SEC office after the exam takes place. 2 93 So
any deficiency letter from the SEC after an examination must be carefully
reviewed to ensure the information upon which it is based is accurate, and if
so whether the legal analysis is based on the correct statute, regulation, or
rule. And if not, a prompt, thorough, and measured response is essential.
These SEC procedures highlight the need for the firm and the adviser to
consider consulting counsel to assist with the SEC examination process.
c. Fiduciary Duties Defined and Interpreted by the
Courts
As mentioned above, investment advisers have fiduciary duties in
two contexts: 1) in the investment advice they provide;29 4 and 2) in the fees
they charge for that advice. 295 The duty is slightly different in each context;
each of which is discussed separately below.




294 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
295 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006); Jones, 559 U.S. _ (2010).
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i. Supreme Court Definition of Fiduciary
Duty When an Investment Adviser Provides
Investment Advice - Higher Than For
Parties Acting at Arm's-Length
As stated previously, the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940 does
not actually contain the words "fiduciary duty."29 6 To the contrary, it only
prohibits "fraud." 29 7 Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted a fiduciary
obligation from the "manifest purpose" of the Act in Capital Gains, where
the Court addressed whether the SEC could compel an investment adviser
to disclose certain practices to his clients.2 98 The case arose after the SEC
discovered that an investment adviser had been purchasing shares of a
company immediately before recommending that clients invest in the same
company.299 After the price of the shares had increased after his clients had
purchased them at his recommendation, the adviser would sell his shares at
a higher price.3 0 0  The SEC attempted to file an injunction under the
Investment Advisers Act that would require the adviser to inform clients of
his interests in the companies he was recommending.3 0'
While the adviser argued that the Advisers Act did not require
disclosure, the Court held that the SEC could compel such actions because
the Act imposed a duty to deal with clients in good faith.302 The Court
explained that the Advisers Act "reflects congressional recognition of the
delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship," because
the legislative intent and "manifest purpose" of the Act was to protect
consumers from advice that "was not disinterested."3 0 3  Importantly,
because the Supreme Court interpreted the Act's "manifest purpose" as
protecting investors from biased advice regardless of whether it was
296 See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
297 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
298 See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180.
299 Id. at 183.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 181.302 Id. at 194 (explaining that this duty stems from the "broad proscription" of the
Advisers Act prohibiting any acts that could be "fraud or deceit").
303 Id. at 191 (finding that in order to protect consumers advisers should act in good
faith, fully disclose all "material facts" and to take reasonable steps to "avoid
misleading" prospective or current clients).
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purposeful or unconscious,0"4 a violation of fiduciary obligations does not
require proof of intent to injure. 305
Thus, the Court held that the "fraud" proscribed by the Act was not
the intentional and overt conduct to misrepresent as defined at common
law, but rather the definition of fraud as it had been more broadly defined in
courts of equity:
Fraud .. . in the sense of a court of equity properly includes
all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly
reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.306
Therefore, adviser customers suing for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with investment advice do not have the high burden of proving
the elements of fraud applicable in suits between parties to "an arm's-length
transaction." 3 0 7
Interestingly, as discussed in the next sub-section, the Supreme
Court has recently created a paradox as it pertains to adviser conduct
standards by reference to arm's-length business standards. The Court
recently ruled that adviser customers suing for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the fees they were charged by the adviser (as opposed to
the advice received) have the burden to "show that the fee is outside the
range that arm's-length bargaining would produce."30 8 Thus, the Court
holds advisers to a higher duty than a party to an arm's-length transaction
when assessing the advice provided, but holds advisers to the same duty as
a party to an arm's-length transaction when assessing the fees charged for
that same advice.
There are two elements of an adviser's general fiduciary obligation
to act in good faith when providing advice that are particularly important:
the requirements that advisers first make "full and fair disclosure of
material information," and second, "use reasonable care to avoid
misleading clients.,3 09 These obligations deserve special attention because
failure to fulfill them often results in a violation of the Advisers Act.31 o
3 See id. at 192.
305 See Morris v. Wachovia Sec. Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(analyzing Capital Gains Bureau Research, 375 U.S. at 194).
306 Capital Gains Bureau Research, 375 U.S. at 194.
3o7 Id. at 194-95.
30s Jones, 559 U.S. at 
_ (2010).
309 Capital Gains Bureau Research, 375 U.S. at 191.
310 See, e.g., id. (discussing how a failure to disclose material information regarding
the investment adviser's personal interest in shares was a violation of the Adviser's
Act).
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
provided insight about what constitutes "full and fair disclosure of all
material facts" under the Advisers Act in Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Bolla." In
Bolla, defendants Steven Bolla and Robert Radano created an investment
company that was a registered investment adviser.312 Mr. Bolla was later
barred by the SEC from associating with or serving as an investment
adviser for fraud. The defendants continued to operate the company and
give advice without informing any clients about Mr. Bolla's bar by the
SEC.3 14 The court held that this information should have been disclosed to
clients because it constituted material information.3 1s
The Court explained that the determination of what facts are
material is based on whether a "reasonable investor" presented with the
"total mix" of information would have considered it "important to any
further decisions regarding their investment future."316 Investment advisers
must disclose "complete, truthful and accurate information" that is relevant
to the company and the client, even if the client may have already been
aware.317 Because the defendants did not disclose material facts regarding
Mr. Bolla's bar by the SEC, their actions constituted violations of the
Advisers Act.
Investment advisers must also take reasonable steps to avoid
making different disclosures to different clients. In SEC v. Tambone, 319 the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that senior executives of a company that
managed mutual funds violated their fiduciary duty by knowingly allowing
short-term investors to engage in round-trip trading that harmed the long-
311 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2005).
312 See id. at 48.
313 See id. at 50.314 See id. at 54.
315 Id. at 67-69 (explaining that such a violation hinges on proof that the facts were
material and that there was a duty to disclose which was not met or done
fraudulently).
16 Id. at 69.
3 See id. (explaining that it would be "absurd and undermine" the statute if the
court allowed investment advisers to breach their duty just because a client should
have known about the material information or should have known the adviser
would not truthfully provide such information).
318 See id. at 67.
319 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008), vacate in part
en banc, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. Mar. 10, 2010) (vacating the previous panel's
opinion only as to the parties' Rule lob-5 claim under the Securities Exchange Act,
but not the previous ruling on the claims under 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 of the Investment
Advisers Act).
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term investors in a mutual fund.3 20 The company had adopted a strict
prohibition against the practice of engaging in "roundtrips," where
investments are rapidly shuffled into and out of funds to benefit individual
investors but often with harmful effects on the rest of the investors in the
fund.3 2 1 But the defendants continued to "approve or knowingly allow"
short-term investors to engage in the practice contrary to the information
they provided to the rest of their clients.322
While this type of investing was not illegal per se, the advisers
violated their duty by misleading clients to believe the "roundtrip"
investments were prohibited yet allowing short-term investors to make
them at the expense of long-term investor clients.32 3 In failing to disclose
this practice to long-term investors, the defendants did not take
"reasonable" steps to avoid misleading clients, and instead actively
deceived clients who believed the trading was prohibited. 324 As a result,
the investors ultimately failed to place their clients' interests first or to act
in good faith.325
ii. Supreme Court Definition of Fiduciary
Duty When an Investment Adviser Charges
Fees for Its Advice - The Same As For
Parties Acting at Arm's Length
In 1970, Congress amended section 36 of the Investment Company
Act to impose on investment advisers a fiduciary duty "with respect to
compensation received . . ., and granted individual investors a private right
of action for breach of that duty."3 2 6 Prior to this amendment, investors in
mutual funds managed by an investment adviser could only challenge the
adviser's fee under state-law corporate waste theories, which require a
showing that the fee is "unconscionable or shocking."32 7 While the
amendment sought to provide shareholders with more protection against
unreasonable fees by lowering the burden of proof, it also sought to avoid
giving the SEC or the courts the power to effectively act as rate-setters by
subjecting adviser fee agreements to a "reasonableness" standard as
320 See id. at 146.
321 See id. at 112.
322 See id. at 113.
323 See id. at 146.
324 See id. at 147 (explaining that the defendants distributed prospectuses which
claimed "strict prohibitions" against "roundtrip" trading but allowed the practices
to continue without making any effort to inform clients or adjust the prospectuses).
325 See generally Richards, supra note 279.
326 Jones, 559 U.S. _ (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)).
327 Id. at Slip Op. at 3-4.
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interpreted by the SEC and the courts.328  The compromise was the
fiduciary duty amendment in section 36(b) of the Investment Company
Act. 329
Since 1970, lower circuit courts have provided differing
interpretations of the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36. Some circuits,
including the lower appellate court in Jones, held that the duty is satisfied
as long as the adviser makes a full disclosure of the fee to customers and
"plays no tricks."330 These courts find that as long as full disclosure is
made, there is no cap on the fee that an investment adviser can charge its
customers. 33 ' The theory underlying this position is that the contemporary
mutual fund market is robust, with thousands of funds competing for
investors, and that "sophisticated investors" will shop for funds with the
best results and avoid funds that charge excessive fees.332 These courts find
that any other interpretation of fiduciary duty as it applies to fees "'relies
too little on the markets."'
33 3
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected this approach, and instead
adopted the approach first articulated by the Second Circuit in Gartenberg
v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgt., Inc.334 This standard looks not only to whether
an adviser has fully disclosed the fee, but also looks to see whether the fee
is commensurate with one that would result from "arm's length
bargaining:"
We conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic
formulation of what §36(b) requires: to face liability under
§36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have
been the product of arm's length bargaining.33 5
But this standard alone leaves many questions unanswered. So the Court
went about trying to resolve some of them. In the process, the Court
revealed several caveats or "sub-holdings" to its primary holding above.
328 See id. at Slip Op. at 4.
329 See id. at Slip Op. at 4.
330 See id. at Slip Op. at 5.
331 See id. at Slip Op. at 5.
332 See id. at Slip Op. at 5-6.
See id. at Slip Op. at 6 (quoting lower court in Jones v. Harris Assoc., 527 F.3d
627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008)).
334 See id. at Slip Op. at 9 (adopting the approach in Gartenberg, 694 F.2d 923
(1982)).
3 Id. at Slip Op. at 9.
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First, while the Court took its definition of fiduciary duty from trust
law, it noted the Act's significant modification to the duty as it exists in
trust law - the Act "shifts the burden of proof from the fiduciary to the
party claiming breach to show that the fee is outside the range that arm's-
length bargaining would produce."
Second, to avoid the danger that courts would second-guess adviser
fees and act as de facto rate-setters for fund advisers, the Court held that
lower courts must give "considerable weight" to an adviser fee negotiated
with and approved by a disinterested fund board of directors that has
"considered the relevant factors."337 Less deference to a board-approved
fee is reasonable when it is shown that an adviser failed to disclose to the
board important information about the fee or how it was set.3  This
comports with the deference Congress sought to provide mutual fund
boards in the Act.339
Third, lower courts are not expected to "engage in a precise
calculation of fees representative of arm's-length bargaining." 3 40 Congress
rejected a "reasonableness" requirement for adviser fees expressly because
such a requirement would charge courts with rate-setting responsibilities:
"Congress' approach recognizes that courts are not well suited to make
such precise calculations." 34 1
Finally, the Court declined to create a categorical rule when
comparing adviser fees in other funds to determine whether the adviser's
fee complies with the fiduciary standard in section 36.342 The Court
recognized that there "may be significant differences between the services
provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to
a pension fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of
shareholder redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual
fund assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and
higher marketing costs." 34 3 When assessing whether a fee is commensurate
336 Id. at Slip Op. at 11.
33 See id at Slip Op. at 15.
338 See id at Slip Op. at 15-16.
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (2006). But see Sam Mamudi, The Unseen
Figures in Charge of Your Funds, WALL. ST. J., May 3, 2010, at RI (noting
charges of critics that fund boards are not doing their jobs because they oversee too
many funds and do not replace underperforming fund managers with enough
frequency).
34Jones, 559 U.S. at _ (2010), Slip Op. at 16.
341 Id. at Slip Op. at 16.
342 See id. at Slip Op. at 13.
343 Id. at Slip Op. at 13-14.
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to an arm's-length fee, courts must reject comparables with "significantly
different" services.
But after this relatively clear guidance, the Court injects some
unnecessary yet significant confusion into the analysis when it then says
that even if the fees and services of a comparable mutual fund are similar,
courts should not rely "too heavily" on this comparison because the
comparable fund fees "may not be the product of negotiations conducted at
arm's-length."34 5 So is the Court saying that an investor must not only
prove that a fund adviser's fee is not commensurate with the fees of
advisers managing comparable funds, but also that the adviser fees of the
comparable funds are themselves at arm's-length? Are customers required
to obtain discovery from comparable third-party fund advisers to meet this
burden? If so, how does the customer overcome the various reasonable
objections from third party advisers to producing this comparable
information?
The sole basis for the Court's apparent assumption that mutual fund
adviser fees are not at arm's-length is 28-year old dicta from the Second
Circuit's 1982 Gartenberg opinion. This dicta says that just because funds
may "vigorously" compete for shareholders, doesn't mean that advisers
compete to manage funds, opining that adviser competition for fund
business "' is virtually non-existent."' 34 6 This opinion by the Court seems
improvident given the age and veracity of its support, and the confusion it
injects into the Court's fee-comparison framework.
It is even more improvident because after telling advisers that
mutual fund adviser fees may not be apples-to-apples (even if the services
and fees are the same), it then says that comparing adviser fees paid by
mutual funds to those paid by by other "institutional clients" may also not
be apples-to-apples.3 47 It's hard to find an unencumbered path for investors
to conclusively prove that the fees charged by their fund advisers are not at
arm's-length because it appears the Court's assumption is that one mutual
fund cannot be reliably compared to another.
34 See id. at Slip Op. at 14.
345 Id. at Slip Op. at 14.
346 See id at Slip Op. at 14 (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929).
347 See id. at Slip Op. at 14 ("Even if the services provided and fees charged to an
independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful that the Act does not
necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds and institutional clients.... By
the same token, courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons with fees
charged to mutual funds by other advisers.").
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So while the press describes the Court's opinion as providing more
"leeway for lawsuits on fund fees,,,3 48 this Article concludes that the Court
might have actually made it more difficult for fund investors to get lawsuits
past summary judgment and to trial:
Comparisons with fees charged to institutional clients,
therefore, will not 'doom any fund to trial.' First, plaintiffs
bear the burden in showing that fees are beyond the range
of arm's-length bargaining. Second, a showing of
relevance requires courts [read investors] to assess any
disparity in fees in light of the different markets for
advisory services. Only where plaintiffs have shown a
large disparity in fees that cannot be explained by the
different services in addition to other evidence that the fee
is outside the arm's-length range will trial be
appropriate. 34 9
5. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act - Another Potential
Source for Defining a Broker-Dealer's New Fiduciary
Duty
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Prudent Investors Act, which sets forth
definitions of the fiduciary duties facing trustees investing funds under
private gratuitous, charitable, and pension trusts. 35 0 Because trustees have
traditionally been viewed as fiduciaries over investment funds and
portfolios similar to those managed by investment advisers (e.g., pension,
portfolio, and mutual fund management), a review of those standards is
helpful to understand where broker-dealer duties may be heading. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's most recent definition of an adviser's fiduciary duty is
taken from trust law. 35
Trustees must comply with the "Prudent Investor Rule," which
mandates in relevant part:
(a) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a
prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
348 See Brent Kendall & Daisy Maxey, High Court Gives Leeway for Lawsuits On
Fund Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar 31, 2010, at Cl.
Jones, 559 U.S. (2010), Slip Op. at 14 n.8.
350 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, § 2(f), (drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and approved by ABA on Feb. 14,
1995).
351 See Jones, 559 U.S. 
_ (2010), Slip Op. at 10-11.
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trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise
reasonable care, skill, and caution.
(b) A trustee's investment and management decisions
respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in
isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole
and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk
and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.352
Compliance with the Prudent Investor Rule requires the trustee to consider
various circumstances when investing and managing trust assets, including:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions
or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of action plays
within the overall trust portfolio, which may include
financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises,
tangible and intangible personal property, and real
property;
(5) the expected total return from income and the
appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and
preservation or appreciation of capital; and
(8) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to
the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the
beneficiaries. 53
A trustee is also not entitled to rely on disclosures provided for
management of the trust assets, but instead is required to make "a
reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the investment and management
of the trust assets."354 Moreover, a trustee is held to a heightened fiduciary
duty commensurate with any special skills or expertise he has advertised
and upon which the trust and its beneficiaries have relied.35 5 These duties
to consider a transaction's effect on the entire portfolio, and the effects of
352 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a)-(b).
3 Id. § 2(c)(1)-(8).
3
-
4 Id. § 2(d).
3 See id. § 2(f).
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the tax laws, inflation, and deflation on a transaction and portfolio, are
similar to those that investment advisers carry, duties that may be soon
foisted upon broker dealers.
The Prudent Investor Rule also imposes a duty of loyalty on the
trustee to manage and invest trust assets "solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries." 5  This is similar to the language in the Investor Protection
Act, which says a financial adviser "shall" act "solely in the interest of the
customer," and goes one step further to prescribe acting "without regard to
the financial or other interest" of the financial adviser.35 7 But the
commentary to the Prudent Investor Act duty also precludes any conflict
the trustee has with third parties involved in a transaction involving trust
assets.
A categorical rule like this for broker-dealers may prohibit the sales
of many products that benefit sponsors, underwriters, or other broker-dealer
customers. This is especially troublesome because, based upon the strict
language in both Acts, it appears this duty to avoid conflicts of interest is
not waiveable. And as discussed at several points in this Article, the
current version of the Senate bill is not clear about whether broker dealers
can waive material conflicts of interest.
The Prudent Investor Act also requires the trustee to consider the
interests of each beneficiary and "act impartially in investing and managing
the trust assets."359 There are many implications here for advisers or
broker-dealers that manage portfolios or funds for multiple individuals or
entities. Advising on securities or products suitable for one set of
beneficiaries may be unsuitable to others, and subject the adviser to
potential liability.360 The commentary to the rule notes that the most
356Id. § 5.
3 See, e.g., Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 103 (a)(2)
(2009) (as introduced).
358 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 cmt. ("The duty of loyalty is not limited
to settings entailing self-dealing or conflict of interest in which the trustee would
benefit personally from the trust. 'The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in
administering the trust not to be guided by the interest of any third person. Thus, it
is improper for the trustee to sell trust property to a third person for the purpose of
benefitting the third person rather than the trust."' (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS 2d § 170, at 371 cmt. q, (1959))).
3 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, § 6.
360 See, e.g., Tambone, 550 F.3d at 110-13 (finding that the misleading practices of
the investment adviser in knowingly allowing short term mutual fund investors to
engage in round-trip trading that harmed the long term investors in the fund were
adequately alleged in the complaint and should not have been dismissed).
2010 A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama - The 73
Evolution ofBroker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-
Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal
Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty
frequent conflict is between beneficiaries interested in income and those
interested in principal investments.
6. Will a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers
Exert Downward Pressure on the Brokerage Industry?
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior." 3 62
Versions of the proposed investor protection legislation require a
broker-dealer offering investment advice to act solely in the customer's best
interest, but do not expressly provide broker dealers with the ability to
waive this strict fiduciary duty.363 In addition, the proposed legislation
contemplates providing the SEC with authority to prohibit compensation
schemes and all conflicts of interest that the SEC "deems contrary to the
public interest and the interests of investors.
Such an uncompromising prohibition on broker-dealers would
prevent the marketing and sale of some of the most popular and suitable
brokerage products, many of which are necessary investment vehicles for
investors. This could "upend business practices at many large brokerage
361 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 6 cmt. (noting that the Prudent Investor
Act does not prescribe any particular regimen to avoid this conflict, and instead
refers to the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act). See, e.g., Tambone, 550
F.3d at 106.
362 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
363 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 913(a)(k); Investor Protection Act
of 2009, H.R. 3817, 11Ith Cong. § 103 (a)(2) (2009); HR 4173, 111th Cong. §
7103(a)(3)(g)(1) (2010) (as introduced).
3 See H.R. 3817, § 103(a)(1)(2); H.R. 4173, § 7103(a)(1)(h)(2), (a)(1)(n)(2).
365 For example, under the prohibitions contained in versions of the Investor
Protection Act, broker-dealers could not sell the following products because of the
inherent conflicts of interest associated with them: fixed, variable, and equity
indexed annuities; all forms of IRAs; mutual funds and insurance products for
which the broker-dealer shares revenue with, and receives a commission from, the
product sponsor; submitting client orders to market makers that are affiliated with
the broker-dealer; matching buy and sell side clients where most suitable; orders to
market makers where the broker-dealer receives order flow payments from the
market maker for a certain volume of customer orders, among other products and
practices.
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firms."366 The result could be that broker-dealers and investment advisers
are only permitted to sell "plain vanilla" investment products and
services, 367 in which case there is no need for financial intermediaries like
registered representatives and investment advisers because the broker-
dealers and investment companies could market and sell these products
directly on their web sites with patterned disclosures. Indeed, the current
version of H.R. 4173 contemplates requiring the SEC to enforce rules that
require broker dealers to make required disclosures "via the Internet." 36 8
This will ultimately negatively affect the bottom line of brokerage firms
and the industry.
In its testimony before Congress on the proposed fiduciary duty,
SIIFMA recognized that the uniform fiduciary duty outlined in the proposed
financial legislation must be amended to permit investors the option to
define and modify the standards which govern their brokerage relationships,
lest the investing public lose the value of innovations to securities products
and services to meet increasingly complex and demanding investor needs:
A new federal standard should also protect investors by
respecting and preserving investor choice, which is part of
putting clients first. This should include investor choice to
select, contract for and receive any of the wide range of
products and services offered by their financial services
provider, and investor choice to define or modify
366 Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Backs New Standards, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2009,
at C3 (noting that SIFMA supports the fiduciary standard proposed by the Obama
Administration).
367 See Jonathan Weisman, Economic Policy 'Nudge' Gives Way to a Shove, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 8, 2010, at A2 (noting that the Obama Administration is eschewing
behavioral economic theory - economic policy can move people into more
efficient economic behavior without "heavy-handed" regulation and legislation -
for more "command and control" measures like pressing "the concept of the 'plain
vanilla' financial products."). However, "[t]hose 'plain vanilla' offerings aren't
included in the financial regulation legislation making its way through Congress."
Id.
368 H.R. 4173, § 7104(b)(1)(C).
369 "The 'more stringent' fiduciary standard could 'exert downward pressure on
revenue' at some brokerage firms. See Lucchetti, supra note 366 (quoting an
analyst report from Banc of America-Merrill Lynch analyst Guy Moszkowski). See
also Maurice R. Greenberg, Six Steps Toward Financial Reform, WALL ST. J., Mar.
5, 2010, at A21 (noting that proposed Obama Administration "Volcker rule" to
limit investment options of banks would create "unintended consequences of
rendering our financial institutions unable to compete in today's global
marketplace."). But see Michael R. Crittenden & Matthias Reiker, Clash Over
'Too Big to Fail, 'WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2010, at C3 (noting that Citigroup CEO
Vikram Pandit testified before Congress that he embraces the Obama
Administration's "limits on banks' ability to engage in proprietary trading.").
2010 A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama - The 75
Evolution ofBroker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-
Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal
Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty
relationships with their financial services provider based on
the investor's preference. In light of the numerous, diverse
and investor beneficial products and services offered by
broker-dealers that differ from, and are far beyond, those
offered by today's investment advisers, a new federal
standard should also recognize and preserve product and
service innovation and capital formation. . . . A new federal
standard thus must be sufficiently flexible to be adapted to
the products, services and advice chosen by the investor,
and applied only in the context of providing personalized
investment advice and securities to individual investors. 3 70
SIIFMA has repeatedly cautioned "that brokers operate under very different
business models than advisers," and that imposing an unalterable, uniform
fiduciary duty on broker-dealers and advisers would be problematic for the
industry and customers. 37' But the Obama Administration has indicated
that it favors more "heavy-handed command-and-control measures" than
does SIFMA, by for example pressing for the concept of compelling
brokers to offer "plain vanilla" financial products, or requiring "retirement
counselors to base their advice on computer models that have been certified
as independent." 37 2 The administration has not indicated who it has in mind
to act as the "independence certifier" under such a scenario.
B. The Legislative Proposal to Empower the SEC to Abrogate
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions Threatens to Make FINRA
Irrelevant and Bring Retail Securities Disputes Back to Court
Obama's draft Investor Protection Act, HR. 4173, and S. 3217
purport to provide the SEC with authority to "prohibit, or impose conditions
or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of
any broker, dealer, [investment adviser], or municipal securities dealer to
370 How Changes to the Financial Regulatory System could Affect Small Broker-
Dealers: Hearing on H.R. 3817 Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th
Cong. 7-8 (2009) (statement of E. John Moloney, President and CEO, Moloney
Securities Company, Inc. and Chairman, Small Firms Committee, SIFMA),
available at http://www.sifina.org/legislative/testimony/pdf/John-Moloney-
testimony-092309.pdf [hereinafter SIFMA Testimony].
3n SEC Would Be Required to Develop One Fiduciary Rule Under New Plan, Sec.
Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 291 (Feb. 22, 2010).
372 Jonathan Weisman, Economic Policy 'Nudge' Gives Way to a Shove, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 8, 2010, at A2 (but also noting that for now the '"plain vanilla' offerings
aren't included in the financial regulation legislation making its way through
Congress.").
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arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the federal
securities laws or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that
such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public
interest and for the protection of investors."373
Interestingly, the drafts of the statutory provisions regarding
abrogation of pre-dispute arbitration clauses from the Obama
Administration, the House, Senator Dodd's draft, and the final Senate bill
went from a recommendation, to a strict-deadline mandate, and back to a
recommendation as follows:
Investor HR 4173 Sen. Dodd Nov. S. 3217
Protection Act '09 draft of the
Financial
Restoration Act
"The "The "Not later than "The
Commission, by Commission, 180 days after the Commission
rule, may by rule, may date of enactment may conduct a
prohibit, or prohibit, or of this subsection, rulemaking to
impose impose the Commission reaffirm or
conditions or conditions or shall conduct a prohibit, or
limitations on limitations on rulemaking to impose or not
the use of' pre- the use of' pre- prohibit, or impose
dispute dispute impose conditions conditions or
arbitration arbitration or limitations on limitations on




The final bill reconciling the House and Senate versions reverts
back to the definition in HR 4173. Also interesting is that the Senate
declined to include in its bill a provision contained in H.R. 4173 that
required the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study of
3 S. 3217, §921(a)(1); H.R. 4173, § 7201(a)(p).
374 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 921 (a)-(b) (emphasis added).
3 See H.R. 4173, § 720 1(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
376 See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111 th Cong.
§ 92 1(a)-(b) (2009) (draft legislation released Nov. 2009) (emphasis added).
3n Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, § 921(a)-(b)
(emphasis added).
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the costs of arbitration compared with litigation, and the "percentage of
recovery of the total amount of a claim in an arbitration proceeding... ."378
There are diverging opinions as to whether industry-sponsored
arbitration favors customers over the securities industry, or vice versa. The
Obama Administration has come down on the side of commentators that
suggest industry-sponsored arbitration is "systematically biased" in favor of
the securities industry. 7 SIFMA took a contrary position in its testimony
before Congress on the Investor Protection Act. 380 The Financial Stability
Act bill in the Senate begs off a mandatory rule, but does provide the SEC
with discretion to bar pre-dispute arbitration provisions, and without a
requirement that the SEC obtain empirical data to support such a
prohibition, as was required by HR 4173.
SIFMA references its own 2007 whitepaper on mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration provisions, and argues that arbitration provisions favor
customers because arbitration is "faster and less expensive than litigation,"
thus enabling small investors to bring claims they could not otherwise
afford to litigate.382 In addition, SIFMA recognizes the "relaxed pleading
standards in securities arbitration," juxtaposed against "[r]ecent Supreme
Court decisions [that] make certain that investors are far more likely to have
their claims dismissed in court" rather than in arbitration. SIMFA reports
that "the percentage of claimants that recover in securities arbitrations ...
37 H.R. 4173, § 7202.
3 See Gedicks, supra note 84, at 565 (noting "widespread criticism of the
arbitration process as 'pro-industry and anti-investor"' (quoting Renee Barnett,
Comment, Online Trading and the National Association ofSecurities Dealers'
Suitability Rule: Are Online Investors Adequately Protected?, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1089, 1105 (2000))).
380 SIFMA Testimony, supra note 370, at 9-10. This is not the first time predispute
arbitration agreements have been attacked. In 1988 the "Securities Arbitration
Reform Act" was introduced as an amendment to the '34 Act and would have
prohibited broker-dealers from entering into predispute arbitration agreements with
customers "so long as that agreement is a condition for establishing a customer
account." SIFMA Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 1-2. The proposal was subject to
three hearings in the House of Representatives and was commented on by
representatives and scholars from the securities industry, claimants bar, and legal
community. Congress did not pass the legislation. See id.
381 See H.R. 4173, §7202.
382 See Hearings, supra note 138, at 25 (statement of Randolph C. Snook).
383 See SIFMA Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 3 (referencing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1954 (2009).
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has remained constant in recent years and average inflation-adjusted
recoveries have been increasing." 84
SIFMA argues that prohibiting pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
provisions in exchange for voluntary post-dispute arbitration is "tantamount
to doing away with securities arbitration" because claimants will seek
"litigation to drive up costs and spur nuisance settlements," to seek "jackpot
justice," or shop forums with anti-business jury pools. 3 ss Securities firms,
on the other hand, will seek litigation to drive up costs for claimants with
386
extensive discovery and motion practice. Either way, SIFMA argues that
eliminating mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in exchange for
voluntary post-dispute arbitration provisions will result in costlier and
lengthier disputes for both sides.8 According to SIFMA, this will also
"result in a complete denial of justice for individuals with smaller
claims."
As mentioned above, the U.S. House, recognizing the debate,
drafted a provision in H.R. 4173 that required the Comptroller of the United
States to conduct a study to review the costs to parties of arbitration
proceedings before FINRA compared to litigation, "the percentage of
recovery of the total amount of a claim" in a FINRA arbitration, and any
additional issues "raised during the course of the study." 89 The report was
to be delivered to Congress no later than one year after the Investor
Protection Act is enacted, and include any recommendations by the SEC on
how to improve the arbitration system. 390
Unfortunately, the Senate bill declined to require such a study, and
instead provided the SEC with discretion to bar pre-dispute arbitration
provisions. However, Congress did require the SEC to adopt such a bar
3 Hearings, supra note 138, at 25 (statement of Randolph C. Snook). See also
SIFMA Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 4 (explaining that the percentage of
claimants who recover by award or settlement "has held steady in recent years, and
in 2006 was 66 percent. Between 1995 and 2004, investors' average inflation-
adjusted recoveries in securities arbitration have followed a generally increasing
trend.").
385 See Hearings, supra note 138, at 25-26 (statement of Randolph C. Snook).
386 See id. at 26.
387 See id.
Id. at 26. SIFMA notes in its 2007 Whitepaper, which studies empirical data on
securities arbitration, that a 1998 study showed that average legal costs were
$12,000 less in arbitration compared to litigation. SIFMA notes the inflation-
adjusted amount would be $22,000 in 2007, and that the gap is likely to be
"substantially wider" today because more recent studies show a "significant
increase in litigation costs since 1988." SIFMA Whitepaper, supra note 134, at 3.
389 H.R. 4173, § 7202.
3 See id. § 7202(b).
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only after a formal SEC rulemaking process, which will require input, and
presumably studies, from industry and customers. 9'
C. The Catch-22 of Statutory Whistleblower Rewards for Plaintiffs
- Do They Forecast the End ofBig-Money Private Remedies
Under the Securities Acts in Exchange for the Modest Private
Remedies for Breaches of Fiduciary Duty Under the Investment
Advisers Act?
The Investor Protection Act, H.R. 4173, and the Senate bill all
propose to empower the SEC to financially reward, and protect from
retaliation, securities fraud whistleblowers.3 92 If the fraud exposed by the
whistleblower results in a monetary sanction of $1 million or more, the
SEC may pay as an award to the whistleblower an amount not exceeding 30
percent of the total sanction.39 ' The Senate bill limits the award to not more
than 30% "of what has been collected" of the total sanction, but also
provides for a minimum award of "not less than 10%" of the total sanction
collected.394 One of the factors the SEC may consider when determining an
award amount is "the degree of assistance provided by . . . any legal
representative of the whistleblower in such action."39 1
Congress also provides a new cause of action for whistleblowers
against an employer for retaliating against a whistleblower employee
reporting under the statute, and provides statutory penalties of "two times
the amount of back pay" due the employee "with interest," and
compensation for "litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorneys' fees."39 The Senate bill did not include a provision in H.R. 4173
that also provided whistleblowers with any "special damages" incurred.397
Whistleblower claims receive a generous six year statute of limitations
period.3 98
391 See S. 3217, § 921.
392 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(a) (draft legislation); H.R.
4173, supra note 16, § 7203(a).
393 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(a) (draft legislation); H.R.
4173, supra note 16, § 7203(a).
3 See S. 3217, § 922(b)(1)(B).
395 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922((b)(1); S. 3217, § 922(c)(1)(B)(ii);
H.R. 4173, § 7203(b)(1).
396 Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(g)(1)(A)-(B); S. 3217, §
922(h)(1)(C); H.R. 4173, § 7203(g)(1)(C).
3 See H.R. 4173, § 7203(g)(1)(C).
398 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(g)(1)(C)(ii); S. 3217,
§922(h)(1)(B)(iii); H.R. 4173, § 7203(g)(1)(B)(iii).
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Whistleblowers and their lawyers would be paid out of an Investor
Protection Fund to be established by the Treasury Department and available
to the SEC.' 99 The Investor Protection Fund will be funded by monetary
and disgorgement sanctions collected by the SEC.400 In a bit of irony, the
SEC is permitted to invest amounts from the Investor Protection Fund in
guaranteed obligations of the United States, but only so long as the
maturities are "suitable" to the needs of the Fund as determined by the
SEC. 401
1. Potential for Serial Litigants and Lawyers
The obvious policy rationale of the Whistleblower provisions is to
encourage employees and officers to report fraud, especially in situations
where the SEC cannot otherwise detect it. While this is certainly a noble
policy, the approach taken by the Obama Administration to achieve it may
produce unintended and unwelcome collateral results, so much so the
Administration may have cut off its nose to spite its face.
The primary issue to be addressed is the most obvious: will the
incentive for large rewards for both reporting securities fraud, and a
separate action for retaliation, produce scores of meritless or fabricated
reports of securities fraud by would-be whistleblowers? If so, what affect
will this have on the brokerage industry? An example of the potential
pitfalls is the abuse that has occurred under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA).402 The ADA carries out the noble policy of ensuring
403people with disabilities have equal access to public buildings. To
facilitate this policy, Congress provides a private right of action for disabled
persons against owners of buildings that have barriers to equal access.
The ADA permits the recovery of attorney fees and costs for prevailing in a
lawsuit alleging barriers to access in violation of the ADA, and prohibits
retaliation against employees that cooperate in reporting and removing
barriers to access.4 05
The ADA has been abused by some litigants and lawyers. The
scenario goes like this: a lawyer finds a named plaintiff that is disabled.
The lawyer then files hundreds of complaints on behalf of the plaintiff
399 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(f); S. 3217, §922(g); H.R.
4173, §7203(f).
400 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(f)(2); S. 3217, §922(g)(3);
H.R. 4173, § 7203(f)(3)(A).
401 See Investor Protection Act, supra note 14, § 922(f)(3)(B); S. 3217, §
922(g)(4)(B); H.R. 4173, § 7203(f)(4)(B);.
402 American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (1990).
403 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006).
40 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2006).
405 42 U.S.C. §§ 12203, 12205 (2006).
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against businesses big and small alleging barriers to equal access.
Sometimes the lawyers will incorporate a non-profit corporation with a
catchy name, like the Disabled Patriots of America, through which
plaintiffs will file lawsuits after joining the organization.40 6 The lawyers
quickly settle with the building or business owner because the plaintiffs'
lawyers do not want to spend too much money in discovery on one lawsuit,
and the building owners do not want to spend money litigating in lieu of
trying to cure the barriers as defined by the ADA and implementing
regulations, if any barriers exist.407 Often times, the complaints filed by the
lawyers are identical, and plaintiffs have no real interest in ensuring any
barriers to access are actually removed.4 08
The abuse has caused much work for the federal courts, both in the
volume of lawsuits and in policing lawyers who do not perform any pre-suit
investigation and have no good faith basis for filing the claim. For
example, a lawyer filed an ADA lawsuit against a gas station alleging in the
complaint that plaintiff was a quadriplegic and a member of the named
disability group plaintiff. At his deposition, the plaintiff walked into the
deposition (clearly not a quadriplegic), testified he wasn't sure he was a
member of the named disability group, he had never met the lawyer before
the deposition, he had never seen the complaint filed on his behalf, and had
no idea he had been identified as a quadriplegic in the complaint.409
The federal court handling this case and many others filed by the
same lawyer had to appoint a special master to review all complaints filed
by this lawyer to ensure that "proper pre-suit investigation had taken
place."410 In addition, some states enacted tougher ADA statutes providing
additional remedies for emotional distress and punitive damages.4 1' These
lawsuits have raised the costs of doing business in many communities, and
caused some small businesses to simply close their doors.4 12 But the most
406 See Andrew Dietderich, Advocates File ADA Suits Against Local Hotels, Malls,
CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., June 28, 2004, at I (noting that the Disabled Patriots of
America and its lawyers have filed over 600 lawsuits through the date of the
article).
407 See, e.g., Keith Matheny, ADA Violation Lawsuits: Legit or for profit?, DESERT
SuN, Aug. 9, 2009 at 1; Press Release, Sen. Tom Harman, ADA Compliance and
Lawsuit Abuse (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://cssrc.us/web/35/news.aspx>id+ 1 080&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport- 1);
Dietderich, supra note 406.
408 See id.
409 See Dietderich, supra note 406.
410 id
411 See Harman, supra note 407.
412 See id.
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deleterious effect of these "bogus claims" is that they undermine the
credibility of "the legitimate disabled community." 413
The circumstances are different between a private ADA plaintiff
and a whistleblower under the financial overhaul legislation. But one need
not think long to imagine how one or a group of would-be whistleblowers
and their lawyers may organize efforts similar to those under the ADA.
Brokerage firms will have incentive to quickly settle a bogus claim by a
threatening whistleblower to avoid the costs and bad press generated by an
SEC investigation or enforcement action, no matter how bogus the claim.
Furthermore, if the would-be whistleblower remains employed by the
broker-dealer, the broker-dealer will have to consider a retaliation lawsuit
by the whistleblower in any future employment action involving the
whistleblower (e.g., passed promotion, termination), even if cause exists in
the form of deficient or risky job performance. This will raise the costs of
doing business for both broker-dealers and their customers.
Congress should study ways to offset the potential abuses
incumbent with the whistleblower reward provision in the financial reform
legislation; perhaps create a requirement that a whistleblower notify the
broker-dealer of the perceived fraud before filing suit. The House bill does
pay lip service to this risk by drafting a provision that reminds
whistleblowers they are subject to criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. §1001
for making false claims.4 14 But the ADA plaintiffs and lawyers are subject
to the same penalties for false statements, testimony, and claims under 18
U.S.C. § 1621, and it has done little to stem the tide of bogus lawsuits.
Failure to remedy this issue risks creating a series of bad faith
whistleblower reports and retaliation lawsuits under the financial reform
legislation that may undermine the credibility of whistleblowers reporting
415legitimate securities fraud concerns.
2. Is the Whistleblower Provision an Offset for Reduced
Damage Remedies for Securities Fraud Plaintiffs?
The whistleblower provision is likely a response to the recent
criticism that the SEC's enforcement division has not historically
"aggressively pursu[ed] tips and whistle-blower complaints," citing the
413 id
414 See H.R. 4173, §7203(h).
415 Even legitimate whistleblowers face legal dilemmas if they blow the whistle in
the wrong manner or to the wrong agency. See, e.g., Arden Dale, UBS Whistle-
Blower Rues the Tack, Not Tune, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 9, 2010, at C2 (noting that tax-
fraud whistleblower was prosecuted for providing incomplete information to
Congress, the SEC, and the Department of Justice, and documenting
whistleblower-reward program the IRS created in 2006).
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Bernie Madoff debacle as the agency's "biggest black eye."'6" But are the
whistleblower reward and fee provisions enacted to offset the potential that
securities plaintiffs will lose their implied private right to bring big-money
damage lawsuits against broker-dealers and others under the '34 Exchange
Act, in exchange for the limited private remedies afforded for an investment
adviser's breach of his fiduciary duties under the Investment Advisers
Act?"
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the fiduciary duty required by the
Investment Advisers Act in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v.
Lewis.4 18 Section 206 of the Advisers Act proscribes wrongful and
fraudulent conduct similar to that which is proscribed under Rule 1Ob-5 of
the '34 Exchange Act.4 19 However, unlike Rule 10b-5, section 206 of the
Advisers Act specifies that the fraud and wrongful conduct is prohibited
against "any client or prospective client."420 Also, unlike Rule 1Ob-5,
section 206 creates a fiduciary duty on the investment adviser towards his
client.4 21 Because of this fiduciary duty, a plaintiff need not plead or prove
intent or scienter to impose liability on an investment adviser under section
206-negligence will suffice.422
Just as the liability standard is less onerous under the Advisers Act
compared with the '34 Exchange Act, so are the remedies. The Supreme
Court has interpreted section 206 as precluding private rights of action for
damages.4 23 Instead, private plaintiffs are limited to recovering the right to
rescind their investment adviser contact, enjoin the adviser's violation of
section 206, and restitution of fees paid to the adviser.4 24 This is contrary to
416 Scannell, supra note 51.
417 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979)
(holding that private implied remedies under the Investment Advisers Act for
violation of an adviser's fiduciary duties preclude monetary awards for diminution
of the value of investments, and are limited to rescission of the adviser-customer
agreement and restitution of any consideration paid for the agreement (fees) less
"any value conferred by the other party." (quoted in Morris v. Wachovia Sec., 277
F. Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003))).
418 Lewis, 444 U.S. 11.
419 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
420 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)-(3) (2006).
421 See Morris, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 373 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963)).
422 See Morris, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
423See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24. The remedies for SEC enforcement actions-
disgorgement, statutory penalties, and injunctive relief-are substantially the same
under both the '33 and '34 Acts and the Advisers Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77t
(2006), with 15 U.S.C. § 778u (2006), and 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (2006).
424 See Morris, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 17-19).
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the multi-million dollar securities fraud verdicts plaintiffs have received for
violations of the '33 and '34 securities acts. So the trade-off appears to be
that while plaintiffs may have an easier time proving liability against
investment advisers, the payoff is commensurately smaller.
These facts beg the question: if broker-dealers are fiduciaries, and
broker-dealers are treated like investment advisers as SEC commentators
and Congress have suggested they should be, then it is possible plaintiffs
will be relegated to bringing breach of fiduciary duty claims under the
Advisers Act, which provides very limited private remedies? Perhaps this
is why the financial reform legislation provides handsome rewards and
protections to whistleblowers and their lawyers; an olive branch for gutting
big damage securities fraud cases, and another avenue to assist the SEC
with discovering and investigating securities fraud.
D. It is a Mistake For Congress to Provide the SEC With Carte
Blanche Regulatory Authority Because by Doing So Congress
Fails to Heed the Lessons From the Troubles Caused by the
SEC's Rule 10b-5
The fiduciary standards and supporting policies in the Obama
Whitepaper and proposed legislation leave in their wake many serious
questions about the SEC's ability to create workable, practical, and
enforceable fiduciary standards for broker-dealers and investment advisers.
These questions must be answered by Congress at the policy stage in order
to avoid problems similar to the controversial and differing standards by the
courts and the SEC in interpreting Congress' section 10(b) of the '34
Exchange Act and the SEC's implementing rule 1Ob-5. If not, the new
financial legislation and the SEC's implementing regulations will be
litigated in the courts for years, be subject to serious and substantial
changes, and breed uncertainty and differing standards of liability for
investment advisers and broker-dealers, effectively raising the costs of
securities products for customers.425 Even President Obama's Treasury
Secretary has reminded the SEC, in connection with the negotiations of
financial regulatory reform, that "the administration and Congress set
policy, not the regulatory agencies.'A26
The various versions and justifications of the proposed uniform
fiduciary duty on broker-dealers and investment advisers by the Obama
Administration do not provide enough guidance to the SEC and provide
425 See generally, Stoneridge Inv. Part., LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, 552 U.S. 148,
163 (2008) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975)).
426 Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as Overhaul
Stumbles, WALL ST. J, Jan. 23, 2009 at A4.
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entirely too much authority to regulate this important issue, arguably
subjecting the SEC to a Chevron challenge.4 27 Among other things,
Congress must raise and address the many serious policy questions before
enacting legislation that will provide the SEC with so much authority:428
* When will broker-dealers be considered to be "providing
personalized investment advice"?
* What is the difference between "the public interest" and
"the protection of investors" that provide the SEC power to
regulate the merits of securities products?
* Who is a "retail" investor? Does this include sophisticated
institutional investors?
* Does "aligning" the broker-dealer's fiduciary standard with
the "legal framework" of investment advisers mean that
broker-dealers will be subject to the Investment Advisers
Act? And if so, will broker-dealers have concurrent
obligations under the '33 and '34 securities acts? Will
broker-dealers be required to have both a brokerage and
adviser chief compliance officer and back office?
* How does Congress and the SEC avoid with the Investor
Protection Act and the SEC's implementing fiduciary duty
regulations the same problems encountered with courts
427 In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a two-step analysis to determine whether a
regulation of a governmental agency like the SEC is within the scope of the
congressional statutory provision pursuant to which the regulation was issued. The
Federal Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia rejected the SEC's attempt to
regulate an exception from the Advisers Act for broker-dealers offering brokerage
fee accounts along with their traditional commission-based accounts. See Financial
Planning Assoc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The
court found that the SEC exceeded its authority using the Chevron analysis. And if
the SEC is provided the broad and unguided authority contemplated by the Obama
Administration, and to a lesser extent by Congress, there are certain to be many
lawsuits challenging whatever new regulations the SEC issues.
428 After the Author sent a copy of the manuscript of this Article, including the
questions below, to Congressman Barney Frank on August 24, 2009, Congressman
Frank sponsored H.R. 4173, which includes various new provisions in the Investor
Protection Act that attempt to address some of the questions raised below. Then
the Senate bill went further and adopted one of the primary premises in this article
and compelled the SEC to first conduct a detailed study to address some of these
questions. See S. 3217, § 913(b). The efficacy of these new provisions is analyzed
herein.
86 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5:1
JOURNAL
trying to interpret Congress' section 10(b) and the SEC's
implementing rule 1 Ob-5?
* What remedies if any will be available to private plaintiffs
against broker-dealers for violations of the new fiduciary
duty? Are private plaintiffs limited to the contract-
rescission remedy of the Advisers Act? Or can they still
sue for lost-investment value under the '33 and '34
securities acts?
* Will customers be able to waive the prohibition of broker-
dealers and investment advisers selling profitable products
that are "not in the investors' best interest"? What does it
mean for a product to be "profitable" and thus subject to
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act? And what
is an investor's "best interest"? Can it ever be trying to
obtain larger investment returns by purchasing riskier
securities?
* Will broker-dealers and investment advisers be relegated to
only selling simple, less profitable securities products to
retail investors? Will this stymie creation of investment
products that keep up with the increasing complexities of
the global financial market? Will this drive investors to
non-U.S. markets and exchanges to find riskier and thus
more profitable products?
* If broker-dealers and investment companies are limited to
selling only less profitable, "plain vanilla" securities
products, will there be a future need for registered
representatives or investment advisers since broker-dealers
and investment companies could simply list these products
for purchase via telephone or website with boilerplate
disclosures?
Leaving these questions for the courts will create an avalanche of
new securities lawsuits by the plaintiffs bar seeking to stretch the theories
and limits of liability as far as possible, and create vastly different standards
of liability in the thirteen federal circuits. This is just what happened and is
happening with section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. The Obama Whitepaper
makes this point by acknowledging the rift developed in the courts on what
standards of conduct define primary liability under section 10(b) and rule
1Ob-5 .429
But it is a mistake to leave rulemaking on the section 10(b) primary
liability issue up to the SEC, as proposed by the Obama Administration,
because the SEC will try to expand its power, authority, and liability
429 See Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 73.
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standards as far as the courts will let it. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
declared the SEC went too far with its definition of who could be primarily
liable under section 10(b) when it rejected the SEC's theory of primary
liability adopted by the Ninth Circuit.430  Why would the Obama
Administration again leave it up to the SEC? These lessons reveal that it is
Congress, and not the SEC, that must address these issues head-on at the
policy stage, to avoid improperly subrogating the policy function to the
courts and the SEC.
1. Exhibit One: The Confusion Caused by the SEC's Attempts
to Impose "Scheme Liability " Standards under Section
10(b) of the '34 Exchange Act
At a time when private litigants and the SEC are searching for
additional ways to charge defendants with securities fraud, the standards
which govern the securities laws are in flux. Federal appellate courts across
the country have reached vastly different conclusions when looking at what
conduct can be prosecuted under Congress' section 10(b), and the SEC's
implementing rule (rule 1Ob-5). Even though the Supreme Court recently
weighed in with its opinion in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta,431 debate still rages about precisely what conduct is
proscribed by section 10(b).
Section 10(b) prohibits any "manipulative or deceptive device" that
contravenes SEC rules and regulations.43 2 SEC rule lOb-5 proscribes the
following in connection with the purchase or sale of securities: (a)
employing any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;" (b) making untrue
statements or omissions of material facts; (c) engaging in any act or practice
that operates as a "fraud or deceit."'"33 Courts have struggled mightily over
the years to determine what conduct subjects a defendant to liability under
these standards.
The focal point of the debate is whether, to be primarily liable for
securities fraud under rule 1Ob-5(b), a defendant must actually
communicate a deceptive statement or act directly to the investing public in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities-the "bright line test-"
or whether primary liability may attach with a finding that a defendant
participated in a "scheme to defraud," even if he didn't directly
communicate alleged misinformation to investors in prospectuses, press
430 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008).
431 Id. at 148.
432 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
433 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
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releases, SEC filings, or statements to analysts.434 Since the Supreme Court
interprets the securities laws as precluding private rights of action for aiding
and abetting liability,4 35 private plaintiffs and the SEC have been
advocating a broader standard for primary liability.
Some courts follow the bright line test, which requires that a
defendant actually make a direct statement to the investing public that
contains a misstatement or omission of material fact.436 This limits the
class of potential defendants. The bright line test is based on previous
Supreme Court precedent that said Congress proscribed only two types of
fraud in section 10(b): deception and manipulation.4 37 The Court holds that
a "manipulation" under section 10(b) is a "term of art" that only applies to
situations where a defendant manipulates the market with "wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices"; 43 8 while deception is a misstatement or
omission by a defendant in statements to investors. Because the SEC is not
empowered to extend liability beyond conduct proscribed in section
10(b), 439 some courts and commentators reason that section 10(b)
"manipulation" cases are governed by the "scheme" language in rule 1Ob-
5(a) and (c), while deception cases under section 10(b) are governed by the
misstatement or omission language in rule lOb-5(b). Thus, only rule lOb-
5(b) is implicated in cases involving alleged misstatements or omissions to
investors.440
The SEC and securities plaintiffs advocate a broader standard for
primary liability in cases involving misstatements to the public, arguing that
a defendant may be generally liable under rule 1Ob-5 for participating in a
"scheme" to cause misrepresentations by other defendants to the investing
public."' These courts and commentators find that application of rule lOb-
5(a) and (c) is not limited to market "manipulation" cases, and may be
applied with equal force in cases involving misrepresentations. The
434 See Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liability Under Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c), 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 631, 655 (2006).
435 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
436 See City of Monroe v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 690 (6th Cir. 2005); In
Re Comshare, 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152
F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Craighead v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990); DE & J. Ltd. P'ship v. Conaway,
284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d
717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit has also called this the "direct contacts"
test. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Washington County, 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.
1982); Sec. & Exch. Conmi'n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
437 See Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 177.
438 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
4 39 See U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S, 642, 651 (1997).
440 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 434, at 638-39.
' See id.
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broadest scheme liability standard was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc,42 which was taken from the SEC's
amicus brief in that case. The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant can be
primarily liable if he "substantially participates" in a "scheme to defraud,"
and that "the challenged conduct of the defendant had a principal purpose,
and not just an accidental effect, of creating a false appearance as part of a
deceptive transaction or fraudulent scheme."" 3
The Supreme Court rejects the formulation of primary liability set
forth in Simpson, finding that a defendant must communicate a deceptive
misstatement or act to the investing public to be liable for a deception under
rule 1 Ob-5, otherwise "there would be a risk that the federal power would
be used to invite litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities
litigation and in areas already governed by functioning and effective state-
law guarantees. Our precedents counsel against this extension.',
The Court also notes that the SEC's "scheme liability" standard
"would revive in substance" aiding and abetting liability in private actions
that the Court previously ruled was prohibited in Central Bank."5  The
Court noted that the SEC, by statute, can still pursue claims of aiding and
abetting violations of section 10(b) against defendants who do not make
direct statements to the investing public, as long as all the elements of the
aiding and abetting statute are properly pled and proved."6 In other words,
the primary "scheme" liability standard proposed by the SEC and the
securities plaintiffs bar would render Congress' SEC aiding and abetting
statute nugatory.
While Stoneridge seems to support the "bright line" test requiring a
direct statement to the investing public to support securities fraud liability,
the SEC and the securities plaintiffs' bar have latched on to a statement by
the Court that "conduct itself can be deceptive.'" 7 They argue this means
deceptive acts are not limited to oral or written statements, leaving open the
possibility that defendants that do not directly communicate anything to the
investing public may still be subject to "scheme liability." Arguably, the
Court's statement is dicta because it was conceded by the parties and
neither briefed nor argued." 8  But cases decided post-Stoneridge reveal
442 Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
44 Id. at 1048.
4" Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008).
44 See id. at 162-63.
446 See id. at 163-64, 166.
447 Id. at 158.
448 The Court is "not bound to follow [its] dicta in a prior case in which the point
now at issue was not fully debated." Cent. Virginia Comty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S.
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courts are open to and debating ever-widening definitions of primary
securities liability." 9
The SEC is also jockeying with the Obama Administration to use
its overhaul of financial regulation as a way to end-run Stoneridge and
possibly legislate a scheme liability standard. Indeed, the Treasury
Department's whitepaper on financial regulatory reform says that "[t]he
SEC also proposes amending the federal securities laws to provide a single
explicit standard for primary liability to replace various circuits'
formulations of different 'tests' for primary liability."450 While the first
drafts of the proposed Investor Protection Act from the U.S. Treasury and
Congress do not yet take up this SEC cause, they do broaden the SEC's
authority which could leave the SEC free to try and regulate around
Stoneridge with the imprimatur of Congress.
Given the split in the circuits regarding the need for a direct
statement by the defendant, the standard for establishing primary liability
for participation in a scheme to defraud is currently uncertain. Congress
should study and then legislate clear and specific rules regarding primary
liability under the proposed legislation lest we repeat a debate similar to the
"scheme liability" debate that still rages in the courts.
E. The Senior Investment Protection Provision - Requiring the
SEC to Oversee Individual State Implementation of FINRA's
Suitability Rules for Annuities; A Jurisdictional Quagmire?
As discussed in Part I.B.5 of this Article, H.R. 4173 creates the
Senior Investment Protection Program ("the Program"). As drafted, the
Program requires the SEC to establish and oversee a grant program that will
provide certain states with federal funds to better protect seniors purchasing
certain "financial products," defined as "securities" and "insurance
products," the definition of which includes "insurance products which pay a
return, whether fixed or variable."45 1 The Act appropriates $8 million to the
SEC to fund this grant program,45 2 but limits each State to $500,000 per
fiscal year, and only if that state complies with various requirements.45 3
356, 363 (2006). Moreover, the Stoneridge Court's resolution of this question was
not relevant to or required for the Court's true holding: "[i]n this case ...
respondents' course of conduct included both oral and written statements."
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
449 See, e.g, In re Mutual Funds Inv. Ltd., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009); Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D.N.J. 2009).
450 Obama Whitepaper, supra note 3.
41' H.R. 4173, §7702(2).
452 See id §7706.
453 See id. §7703(b).
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These grant requirements include that the State: 1) adopt "standard
rules on the suitability requirements in the sale of securities," which at a
minimum must conform to FINRA's suitability requirements; and 2) adopt
suitability and supervision rules for "insurers and insurance producers" for
all annuity products sold in the State that are at least as protective as
FINRA Rule 2821, entitled "Members' Responsibilities Regarding
Deferred Variable Annuities."
Thus, at the same time H.R. 4173 creates a federal fiduciary
standard, it only requires States receiving federal grant money under the
Act to adopt FINRA's suitability rules for sales of securities and certain
"insurance products," with a focus on variable annuities. The Act requires
states to "coordinate" FINRA's rules "governing broker dealers" for "state
insurance regulators to rely on." Recognizing the tension on broker-dealers
operating under a federal fiduciary standard while selling annuity products
that are created by insurers operating under a state suitability standard, the
Act permits states to grant "exemption from such rules only if such
exemption is consistent with the protection of consumers."45 4 In addition to
the operational confusion for broker-dealers attempting to sell variable
annuities to customers in 50 different states with potentially 50 different
rules governing the sales of variable annuities, a more important and
fundamental jurisdictional question is raised.
FINRA only has jurisdiction to regulate "securities" sold by
securities brokerage firms.4 5 5  FINRA concedes that it does not have
jurisdiction over insurance products "licensed and regulated by state
insurance commissions." 456 A fortiori, FINRA rules only apply to securities
sold by broker-dealers-they do not apply to insurance products sold by
insurance agents governed by state insurance laws. By giving the SEC
exclusive jurisdiction to create and oversee the Senior Investment
Protection Program, and apply FINRA's rules to states under the Program,
Congress may have made the same mistake as FINRA by presuming that
454 Id. §7703(c)(5)(B)(vii)-(viii).
455 See FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm; see also FINRA, Help Your Employees
Achieve Their Retirement Dream: Tips for Spotting Early Retirement Scams,
http://www.finra.org/investors/smartinvesting/retirement/p038341 (noting that
FINRA only has jurisdiction over securities brokerage firms).
456 See FINRA, Help Your Employees Achieve Their Retirement Dream: Tips for
Spotting Early Retirement Scams,
http://www.finra.org/investors/smartinvesting/retirement/p038341.
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"variable insurance products are securities.'457 In many, if not most states,
they are not.
In Michigan, for example, the Insurance Code defines variable
annuities as a "line of insurance,"45 8 and has express provisions dealing
with variable annuities.4 59 Not only that, Michigan's Uniform Securities
Act expressly excludes all manner of fixed and variable annuity products
from the definition of "security" under the Act.4 60  Therefore, variable
annuities are regulated in Michigan as insurance products, and fall under
the jurisdiction of the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Services
and its Commissioner.46 ' Because FINRA admittedly does not have
jurisdiction over insurance products regulated by state insurance
commissioners, it is interesting (and perhaps even unconstitutional) that the
Act conditions federal grant funds to states on those states regulating their
insurance products under rules that are not intended to regulate insurance
products.462 Indeed, Congress notes in a separate House bill, related to
overall systemic risk to the financial system, that the "appropriate financial
regulator" for "any financial institution engaged in providing insurance
under State insurance law" is "[t]he State insurance authority of the State in
which an insurance company is domiciled.4 63 Congress may have its work
cut out for it on completing and implementing the Senior Investment
Protection Program; if not, the courts will.44
457 FINRA Investor Alert, Seniors Beware: What You Should Know About Life
Settlements,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndlnsura
nce/PO 18469 (last visited June 23, 2010).
458 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.1206(e) (2010).
459 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.4073 (2010).
460 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2102c(c)(iii) (2010).
461 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.102, 202 (2010); see also Mark Maremont &
Leslie Scism, Investors Recruit Terminally Ill to Outwit Insurers on Annuities,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2010, at Al.
462 A full constitutional analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this Article, the
Journal's space constraints, and this Author's time constraints and intellectual
bailiwick.
463 See Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 111th Cong., §
1403 (1st Sess. 2009).
464 See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Struggling Over a Rule for Brokers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2010 (noting the insurance industry is opposed to the additional
regulations proposed by Congress because their agents are already subject to
various regulatory exams, including exams conducted by FINRA); see also
Kimberley Strassel, Carbon Caps Through the Backdoor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2010, at A 19 (opining that National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) and environmental special interest groups are creating regulations to
impose cap and trade rules that otherwise cannot be passed by state governors or
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IV. PENDULUM POLICY EFFECTS OF INCREASED REGULATION OF
BROKER-DEALERS - A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL FORESIGHT OF
MODERATION
Regulation of the U.S. securities industry has two seasons: 1) calls
for increased regulation in the wake of corporate accounting or securities
scandals; and 2) calls to relax regulation because of large judgments or
companies fleeing U.S. exchanges. 465
Now we have a call for increased securities enforcement and
regulation in the wake of the market meltdowns and vulnerability caused by
the failures of mortgage-backed securities and the Bernie Madoff fraud.
And this brings us the proposals by the Obama Administration. There is no
debate that securities regulation and enforcement standards require an
overhaul. However, Congress should be the entity to do it, not the SEC.
Congress has the ability to avoid again swinging the pendulum too far in
one direction because it has the experience and expertise to carefully study,
analyze, and draft policy that will strike the right medium between better
regulation and enforcement of securities, and ensuring that the U.S.
securities market offers the best and most competitive securities products
available in the world.
SIFMA strikes the right chord in its suggestion to Congress. To
strike the right balance between inaction and overregulation that will stifle
product innovation and selection, and drive companies to off-shore
exchanges, SIFMA recommends providing investors the choice and ability
to modify their relationship with their financial adviser to enable the
investor to purchase securities products suitable to the investor and his
466preferences. In other words, SIFMA proposes that investors have the
ability to waive the prospective fiduciary duty owed them by their broker-
dealers, and in exchange have access to the "diverse and investor-beneficial
products and services offered by broker-dealers that differ from, and are far
beyond, those offered by today's investment advisers.A 67  This will
legislatures, and noting that the SEC's most recent climate change disclosure rules
do the same thing).
465 See supra Part I.B.6; see also John D. McKinnon, Lawmakers Target Investment
Banks, WALL. ST. J., May 5, 2010, at Cl (noting that Congress raising investment
bank duties to customers from suitability to fiduciary in the wake of the Goldman
investigation could "foster unintended consequences that harm business and
investors alike.").
466 See SIFMA Testimony, supra note 370, at 23.467 Id
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"recognize and preserve product service and innovation and capital
formation.' 8
But the industry also carries some responsibility. Broker-dealers
must ensure that the "waivers" are clear and understandable, and not hidden
in account-opening forms. If not, broker-dealers open themselves up to
liability that customers will neither notice nor understand what exactly they
are waiving, or registered representatives will tell customers that the new
federal regulations preclude them from making the customer "real money,"
among other potential claims.
One suggestion is to modify the disclosure language proposed by
the SEC in its 2005 rule and adapt it for the waiver of fiduciary duties:
We, as your registered representative and broker-dealer,
have a legal obligation to treat you as our fiduciary. This
means that the law requires us always to act solely in your
interest and avoid conflicts of interest we may have in any
transaction we execute for you, such as compensation we
receive based on what products you buy.
However, acting as your fiduciary limits the choice of
securities products and options we can offer you.
Sometimes, securities and products that cause our interests
to conflict are the most suitable products for the individual
customer.
Because you understand the product limitations imposed by
the fiduciary duty we owe you, you agree to waive that
duty and agree that we will provide you with suitable
investments that may in some respects cause conflicts
between your interests and ours, including the fact that we
may be paid by people who compensate us based on what
you buy.
Please ask us questions to make sure you understand your
rights and our obligations to you.
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has indicated that the Commission
may agree with providing investors with the ability to waive conflicts when
she noted in March 2010 that she thinks point-of-sale disclosures should
extend beyond mutual funds. Ms. Shapiro remarked that the disclosures
"need to broadly apply across financial products available to retail
investors.... She cited equity-indexed annuities as an example of a product
468 d
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where compensation and conflict-of-interest disclosures would be valuable
to investors.'4 9
Another reason that Congress should specifically legislate new
financial regulatory standards, and not permit the SEC to regulate them, is
because it avoids the constitutional problems and arguments raised when
the SEC and other regulatory bodies are seen to be regulating rules and
standards that otherwise could not be legislated.470  For example, SEC
Chairman Schapiro has remarked that if legislation regarding point-of-sale
disclosures for mutual funds does not pass, "'[the SEC] will work as best
we can under our existing authority to try and maximize our ability to do
real point-of-sale disclosure."'4 7 1 Another example of the SEC perhaps
stepping beyond its constitutional boundaries is when it interpreted existing
disclosure rules to apply to various climate change disclosures, even while
Congress has stalled in passing climate change legislation.4 72 These actions
by the SEC have caused uproars in Congress, 473 with some in the public, 47 4
and even within the SEC.4 75
9 SEC Reviewing Point-of-Sale Disclosures Beyond Mutual Fund Industry,
Schapiro Says, Securities Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 261 (Feb. 15, 2010);
see also SEC Staff Mulling Recommendation for Custody Disclosures from
Brokers, Securities Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7 at 263-64 (Feb. 15, 2010)
(noting the SEC wants to impose advisor custody rules on brokers because Madoff
held advisory clients' assets in a related brokerage he owned).
470 See. e.g., Strassel, supra note 464 (taking issue with securities and insurance
regulators imposing regulations that cannot otherwise pass as legislation).
471 SEC Reviewing Point-of-Sale Disclosures Beyond Mutual Fund Industry,
Schapiro Says, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 261 (Feb. 15, 2010).
472 See Strassel, supra note 464 (taking issue with securities and insurance
regulators imposing regulations that cannot otherwise pass as legislation).
473 See Matthew P. Allen, SEC Opens the Door for Climate Change-Related
Shareholder Proposals and Disclosure Requirements, With Potential New
Liabilities for Public Companies, Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 9 at 359-60 &
n.7 (Mar. 1, 2010) (referring to letter from Reps. Joe Barton (R-Texas) and Greg
Walden (R-Ore.) from the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce to SEC
Chairman Mary Schapiro slamming "the interpretive release as effectively
functioning as a formal rule without the requirements and safeguards of the time-
consuming formal rulemaking process.").
474 See Allen, supra note 473, at 359-60 & 359 n.8 (citing Editorial, Insecurity and
Change Commission: Never Mind Madoff SEC Gumshoes Are on the Climate
Beat, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at A14 (decrying SEC climate change disclosure
guidance as a mechanism to promote the Obama Administration's cap and trade
bill, and "creating new litigation raw material for the plaintiffs bar").
475 See Allen, supra note 473, at 359-60 & 359 n.9 (citing Kara Scannell, SEC
Discord Could Stymie Shcapiro's Efforts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2010, at B 1 (quoting
SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey, who accused the SEC of "placing 'the
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Respectfully, it is not the role of the unelected SEC to regulate
standards that cannot be legislated by a Congress elected by the People.
Congress strikes the right cord in its draft legislation by requiring the SEC
to study these issues. Whether Congress then legislates, or permits the SEC
to regulate, based on those studies remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
There is need for change in the regulation and enforcement of
broker-dealers under the securities laws. But Congress, not the SEC,
should be the body to do it. Congress should study and analyze the
proposals in the draft legislation affecting broker-dealers and investment
advisers, determine the long and short-term policy effects, and enact
detailed legislation that provides a clear guide on the rules and business
practices governing broker-dealers.
imprimatur of the commission on the agenda of the social and environmental policy
lobby.')).
